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[I]n which the cartographer explains himself… 
My job is to imagine the widening                                                                                     
of the unfamiliar and also                                                                                                 
the widening ache of it;                                                                                                       
to anticipate the ironic                                                                                                        
question: how did we find                                                                                                  
ourselves here? My job is                                                                                                  
to untangle the tangled. 
 
In which the rastaman disagrees 
The rastaman has another reasoning.                                                                               
He says – now that man’s job is never straight-                                                                
forward or easy. Him job is to make thin and crushable                                                     
all that is big and real as ourselves; is to make flat                                                            
all that is high and rolling; is to make invisible and wutliss                                                 
plenty things that poor people cyaa do without… 
 
… And then again                                                                                                                
the mapmaker’s job is to make visible                                                                                  
all things that shoulda never exist in the first place                                                             
like the conquest of pirates, like borders,                                                                           
like the viral spread of governments… 
The Cartographer Tries to Map a Way to Zion by Kei Miller (2014: 16–17) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
A storm is blowing from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence 
that the angel [of history] can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels 
him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him 
piles skywards. This storm is what we call progress… 
Illuminations by Walter Benjamin (1973: 259–60) 
_____________________________________________________________________ 
 
The end of all Political associations is the Preservation of the Natural and 
Imprescriptible Rights of Man; and these rights are Liberty, Property, Security, and 
Resistance to Oppression. 
Article Two of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of Citizens by the National Assembly of 
France (1789), in Thomas Paine’s 1791 translation (2015: 68–9) 
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Summary  
 
Development researchers, governance specialists, security and international relations 
analysts are cartographers of the modern world. Their job is to untangle the tangled, yet in 
doing so they all too often make flat all that is high and rolling. This paper considers one 
particular piece of map-making: the interface between security and development. It tries to 
render visible some of the bumps, joins and turnings which lie beneath the maps.  
 
It starts by arguing for a historical perspective. The theory and practice of security is like that 
of development issued from the historical transformations which gave rise to the post-Second 
World War world order. Since the end of the Cold War they have increasingly intertwined and 
security has been mainstreamed into development. Yet neither security nor development has 
fully extricated itself from the violent and extractive relationships which developed in the 
colonial period and continue in many respects to this day.  
 
The paper then explores the ensuing contradictions which lie at the heart of the security–
development nexus. On the one hand, security is a process of political ordering. Even more 
than development, it intermeshes with established power structures, property relations and 
inequalities. On the other hand, it is founded upon the claim that states and other forms of 
public order make citizens safe from violence and insecurity. In principle, it is equally shared 
and socially inclusive, even if in practice it is anything but. 
 
The vernacular understandings, day-to-day experience, resilience and agency of the people 
and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’ are the touchstone by which to evaluate 
security. Most people fall back upon their social identities – as women and men, members of 
families, clans, castes, ethnic groups, sects, religions and nationalities – to navigate their 
social worlds, to respond to insecurity and (sometimes) to organise for violence. At the same 
time, these identities are written into the structures of power and inequality, being deployed 
to establish hierarchies of citizenship and patterns of exclusion. Ensuring that security is 
inclusive is fraught with difficulty and must be negotiated at multiple levels. 
 
Those who live in conditions of poverty and insecurity mostly do not make sharp distinctions 
among the causes of their misery, be they violence, displacement, ill health, starvation or 
environmental degradation. Whilst they experience insecurity and deprivation locally, they 
are at risk as well from global and national shocks and stresses. Multilevel empirical analysis 
of the missing links in the causal chains that bind different forms of risk and link local with 
wider insecurities is a high priority but immensely challenging. 
 
The security–development nexus is not only historically contingent, but is also being torn 
apart by the gathering winds of change. Global balances of profit and power are shifting as 
new poles of global economic growth and political influence emerge. Powerful market forces 
drive the privatisation of the military and security sector, as well as feeding the markets in 
drugs and other illegal commodities, which create powerful incentives for political as well as 
criminal violence. Rapid technological changes, notably in information technologies, are 
transforming the worlds of war as well as work, and translate into struggles to control 
communication and shape political discourse. The framework of political authority is 
loosening, called in question by new forms of subaltern politics, not just in ‘fragile’ states, with 
greatly varying consequences, some violent, others more peaceful.    
 
How more inclusive and secure societies can emerge in this fluid and contested 
environment, and how they can meet the immense challenges of the twenty-first century are 
the questions posed in the final section of this paper. Four central challenges stand out.   
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First, there are the immense problems of collective action, when the interests, ways of 
working and networks of major development and security actors tug them in diverging 
directions. Second, there are the difficulties of working simultaneously with the grain of 
history and with the winds of change. Third, there is a pressing need for democratic 
alternatives to the existing theory and practice of security and of development. Finally, there 
is the struggle to ensure that the voices of poor and vulnerable people are heard in an 
unequal world; that their agency counts for something; and that they can begin to bring to 
account those most responsible for their insecurity. 
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1 Are security, economic development and 
human freedom indivisible?  
Figure 1.1  The virtuous triangle: security, development, human freedom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The winds, which open blue skies, also bring cloud, rain and thunder as they propel the 
angel of history irresistibly into the future, gazing helplessly back at the wreckage piling up 
behind.1 This paper starts by scrutinising one specific corner of blue sky, the ‘indivisibility of 
security, economic development and human freedom’ delineated by the United Nations (UN) 
report A More Secure World (UN 2004: 9) and portrayed in Figure 1.1. This vision is 
enshrined in numerous UN reports and by the World Bank’s comprehensive World 
Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development (World Bank 2011). It is the 
rationale for the development industry’s embrace of security as an important if controversial 
part of its mandate and for recent proposals that security should be included amongst the 
Sustainable Development Goals. 
 
A chasm seems to divide this benign triangle and the unholy chaos of political violence, 
maldevelopment and oppressive governance still present in many regions of the developing 
world. International interventions supposed to stabilise insecure regions and countries, like 
Afghanistan, Libya or the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), have faltered or 
engendered even more insecurity. The international principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’2 
has proved unenforceable or even damaging in situations of complex political violence like 
Darfur, Somalia, Libya or Syria. Progress towards the Millennium Development Goals has 
been compromised by harsh austerity programmes, which have worsened inequalities and 
become a source of insecurity in their own right. Democratisation has not necessarily 
fostered inclusion; and in some cases like Pakistan, Kenya or Egypt, it has given rise to 
political violence. Even apparently established democracies, like Sri Lanka and India, have 
                                               
1 See Benjamin’s memorable image in the epigraph on page 1.  
2 As propounded by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty: ICISS (2001). 
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violated rights and waged war against excluded minorities, all in the name of national 
security.  
 
These engagements with the complex security and development problems of the developing 
world have often taken place under the discursive cover of international security and of 
humanitarian principles, which are often deeply disconnected to the day-to-day lives of most 
people. Yet the meaning of security has to a large extent been taken for granted. There has 
been too little scrutiny of the concept itself and too little reflection on what it can and cannot 
be used to justify.3 Such scrutiny is all the more necessary because it is an essentially 
contested concept with multiple discursive registers. Who talks security? Whose security? 
From what risks or threats? The responses to these questions remain to be elucidated.  
1.1 The backstory: capitalism, war and democracy 
The juxtaposition of security with property on the one hand and resistance to oppression on 
the other, in Thomas Paine’s rendition of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 
Citizens puts its finger on important synergies and tensions, which we shall return to later.4 
The state-centred or ‘realist’ account of security only entered the vocabulary of state practice 
and became a distinct area of academic inquiry in the mid-twentieth century. However, it 
carries heavy historical baggage, which dates back to the establishment of the modern 
Westphalian state system. Its intellectual forefathers include Machiavelli, Hobbes, Clausewitz 
and Weber, all of whom saw political power, military force and the control of violence as the 
essence of statecraft and of what we now term national and international security.  
 
But even for these thinkers the authority of the state was not necessarily absolute. According 
to Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), political order is made and remade around the social bonds 
between the state and its citizens. The Leviathan commands the unconditional loyalty of 
citizens only because it offers protection from the violent anarchy of the state of nature. If it 
does not protect citizens, they can in principle defect.5 And although Weber defined the state 
in terms of its monopoly of legitimate physical force within a given territory, legitimacy and 
political authority rather than force per se was Weber’s principal concern.  
 
Indeed, political authority and, by extension, security, are Janus-faced. Security can be 
viewed as a process of political ordering, structured in large measure around the control of 
violence. But at the same time it can be regarded as an entitlement to protection from direct 
and structural violence, as well as other existential threats such as epidemics, starvation and 
climate change.6 In its modern incarnation such an entitlement inheres not just in citizenship 
but also in the rights and capabilities of human beings, i.e. in ‘human security’ as well as 
‘citizen security’.  
 
The deep tensions between these two visions of security have played out over the centuries 
in different historically constituted political orders. There have been multiple securities, 
imagined and contested by diverse political and social actors in different times and places. 
Each of these has been blown here and there by the shifting winds of history. Each has been 
embedded in wider global configurations of power, social representation and capital 
accumulation.  
 
                                               
3 For an insightful discussion which, like this paper, interrogates what security means to poor and vulnerable people, see Booth 
(2005). 
4 See the quotation from Paine (1791) in the epigraph at the beginning of this paper on page 1. 
5 If not prevented from doing so by the Leviathan’s ability to coerce them into staying! This is one of several ambiguities in 
Hobbes’s analysis.  
6 There is an ongoing debate between those who limit human security just to freedom from violence and the fear of violence and 
those who conceptualise it more widely.  
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It was during the extended nineteenth century that the Westphalian state system reached its 
apogee in Europe, including the consolidation of political order within territorial states and the 
stabilisation of fragile balances of power among states. Recent historical analyses view this 
era as the forging ground in which mutually reinforcing relationships were established 
between the taming of violence, the making of strong but inclusive states and sustained 
economic and technological progress (Bates 2001; North, Wallis and Weingast 2012; Pinker 
2011; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).   
 
It was also in this era that massive inequalities started to open up between the developed 
and developing worlds. These inequalities too have often been explained in terms of the 
different historical paths taken by national societies, which did or did not establish the 
institutional conditions for social order and economic progress, including the rule of law, 
‘perpetually lived organisations’ (like joint stock companies or standing armies), ‘open-access 
orders’ (North et al. 2012) and ‘inclusive political and economic institutions’ (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012).  
 
This historical meta-narrative is convincing up to a point. Yet it places a retrospective gloss 
on the violent and extractive relationships with the colonial world upon which Western states 
built their trade, financed their investments, fought their wars and became global powers.7 It 
tends to obscure an altogether grimmer story of war, political upheaval, imperial expansion 
and economic dislocation, which was equally much associated with the birth of the modern 
world.8 
 
Tilly has argued that the rise of liberal democracy itself was linked not only to economic 
progress but also to military expansion and the industrialisation of war (Tilly 1985a, 1985b, 
1990). Political elites in Europe were held to account by the middle classes, who paid the 
taxes that financed their military ventures. At the same time they were obliged to concede 
rights, including the franchise, to the mass of citizens whom they conscripted into mass 
armies or (in the case of women) employed in war production. Democratisation in its turn 
became associated with profound changes in the way states and national communities were 
imagined: on the one hand, through the lenses of officially sponsored state nationalisms; and 
on the other, through the political mobilisation of previously submerged ethnic and religious 
identities.9   
 
This heady interaction between the creative destruction wrought by capital accumulation, 
militarism, industrialised war, imperialism, nationalism and liberal democracy (summarised in 
Figure 1.2) brought on the catastrophes of the First and Second World Wars. The framework 
of global liberal governance that emerged from this troubled historical matrix in the 1940s 
was specifically designed to prevent recurrence of the deadly combination of economic 
dislocations, extreme nationalism and military adventurism that had led to the two World 
Wars. Its three pillars comprised world peace and security (under the UN Charter), human 
freedom (under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights) and a liberal market economy 
(through the Bretton Woods institutions).  
 
 
 
                                               
7 Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) draw an interesting comparison between colonial societies, which became over-dependent 
upon the extraction of rents, and those that did not, including notably the United States.  
8 Considered in a more critical tradition of historical scholarship, including the work of Hobsbawm (1989, 1995), and Mazower 
(2012) amongst others.  
9 See Anderson (2006) on the imagination of national communities. 
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Figure 1.2  Capitalism, war, imperialism and democracy  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
But how these principles translated into practice was quite another matter, for the post-war 
settlement also reconfigured the structures of empire and brought them in line with the 
informal dominion exercised increasingly by the United States.10 The UN Charter itself 
institutionalised the old principles of great power politics within the Security Council and its 
permanent members – thus undercutting the principle of equal sovereignty among nation 
states, which had paved the way for the dissolution of colonial empires and national 
independence. National sovereignty in turn was potentially and actually in conflict with the 
individual rights and freedoms proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – a 
tension, which has resurfaced in recent controversies over the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ 
(R2P).    
 
Right from the beginning, this framework was co-opted and enfeebled by the structures of 
power and profit from which it had emerged after the Second World War. It is questionable 
whether it ever provided an authoritative enough framework for collective action to manage 
global problems, a question that is returned to in Section 3. Not only were there flaws in the 
UN system itself, but the latter was undermined by superpower rivalry. The Cold War brought 
in new forms of balance of power politics, structured around the ideological divide and 
military competition between the Western and communist blocs. To be sure, the Cold War 
ushered in a ‘long peace’, based on mutual recognition that nuclear competition risked 
becoming a negative sum game. The benefits of this uneasy peace, however, were largely 
concentrated within the strategic and economic heartlands of Europe and North America.  
 
Elsewhere, the unfinished business of the dissolution of empires and of national liberation 
continued and generated struggles over the political and economic spoils of independence. 
These struggles fast became entangled with superpower rivalries. Major wars broke out or 
continued in China, Korea, Greece, Vietnam, Algeria and other countries. The number of 
                                               
10 On the post-war settlement see Mazower (2013) and Judt (2010). 
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wars being fought at any one time increased steadily throughout the Cold War period.11 The 
massive costs in terms of human misery and development opportunities foregone were 
largely ignored by donors and the Bretton Woods institutions as being beyond their 
mandates; and received relatively little attention in the development literature of the time.  
 
The international development community found it convenient to turn a blind eye because the 
major powers of both blocs were deeply involved: either being direct protagonists themselves 
(as in Korea, Algeria, Vietnam and Afghanistan); or waging war by proxy,12 delivering arms, 
training and military assistance to national governments or rebel forces (as in the Horn of 
Africa, Southern Africa and Central America). Development aid tended to be instrumentalised 
as a tool of foreign policy, as with the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, where it was 
coordinated with counterinsurgency. In Eastern Europe too there was a simmering state of 
structural violence, in which dissent was crushed and nationalisms held in check by a 
carefully orchestrated combination of surveillance and brute force. In sum, the history of 
many countries in both the developing South and the communist East was written according 
to a Cold War script, with devastating consequences for their development, national 
sovereignty and political freedoms. 
 
Yet the political, military and economic terrain of the Cold War was neither homogeneous nor 
uncontested. The political construct of a Third World had a distinct impact on the 
international relations of development, although attempts to create alternative models to the 
capitalism of the West and the state socialism of the East were ultimately cast aside,13 not 
least due to the rise of new paradigms of market-driven growth within the former Third World 
itself.  
 
The massive deployment of military force by superpowers did not assure military, still less 
political, victory in ‘asymmetric warfare’ against armed insurgents, especially where the 
governments, which intervening powers supported, lacked popular legitimacy. This was just 
as true of the wars waged or sponsored by the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and the Horn of 
Africa, as of those involving Western powers in Algeria, South-East Asia or Southern Africa.  
Not even counterinsurgency programmes, designed to win hearts and minds by a judicious 
combination of force and development, could be sure of regaining the political and military 
advantage. Less noticed was the capacity of even the most craven and corrupt client 
regimes to extract aid, head off reform and ensure their survival by playing off international 
patrons against each other: President Mobutu in Zaire was the supreme example.     
 
What then did the security and development architecture of the Cold War protect and whom 
did it benefit? To start with, at least it provided the stability in the industrial heartlands 
essential for the rapid expansion of trade and investment initiating an apparent golden age of 
capitalism. Global corporations could not only expand worldwide, but also become footloose, 
detaching their operations and profits from oversight by national governments. At the same 
time, the wealth they created and the stability on which it depended were unequally 
distributed between and inside nations. The welfare state and development assistance were 
meant to spread the risks of economic progress, protecting working people and developing 
countries from the dislocations that had sown havoc in the inter-war period. Yet before the 
end of the Cold War this framework of protection was already under challenge from an 
                                               
11 This increase did not, however, reflect any increase in the number of wars being initiated. Rather, it was because more wars 
were being started than were being brought to a conclusion over the whole Cold War period. Nor was there a consistent trend in 
casualties, which tended to peak during the most destructive conflicts (like Korea, Vietnam, etc.).  
12 Whether and how far they were proxy wars varies from case to case. Almost all had local as well as international roots; but 
were sustained by deadly mixtures of internal violence and external support.  
13 Two of the most promising examples of attempts to create alternative models of democracy and of development were in 
Sandinista Nicaragua and Ujamaa-era Tanzania. They were swept aside in both cases through a mixture of external pressures 
and their own contradictions: see Luckham (1998). 
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increasingly confident private sector and the extension of free market principles to an ever 
wider range of transactions, including the aid business. 
 
However, security was not based solely on military force or balances of power. It was also 
deeply hegemonic, depending on soft power and competing claims to legitimacy. Here the 
West had inbuilt advantages, which became greater as the Cold War continued. The 
framework for global governance under the UN Charter and the Bretton Woods institutions 
was already couched in the liberal language of the Enlightenment. Capitalism, unlike 
socialism, was pre-programmed to innovate and to expand trade and investment globally, in 
the process transforming economies and social structures wherever it penetrated. It gained a 
decisive edge in cultural production, the mass media and new electronic and information 
technologies, which also intertwined with the military sector. The communist bloc, whose 
power and influence in the developing world depended heavily upon military aid and the 
transfer of arms, found it ever harder to compete. All the more as it could not both invest in 
its costly military–industrial complex and deliver the consumer goods, which were the 
coinage of satisfaction and legitimacy in the West.  
 
The end of the Cold War is commonly (and to an extent rightly) seen as a critical juncture at 
which the tectonic plates of global order shifted and opened new spaces for change. Yet it 
can also be seen as part of a longer-term progression, which gathered momentum before the 
eruptions of 1989 and continued long afterwards. The momentum for change came from 
below as much as from above. The great civil society upheavals in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union were the high point. But they had been preceded by the popular 
demonstrations and uprisings which had initiated democratisation in Latin America and parts 
of Asia. The aftershocks continued in Africa and in the Middle East right through to the so-
called Arab Springs. More momentous perhaps than even these political upheavals were the 
economic changes being wrought within the newly industrialising countries of Asia and Latin 
America,14 which even before the Cold War was over began transmitting themselves across 
the former East–West divide – above all, in China.   
 
But the impact of these transformations was highly uneven. On the one hand, they left the 
imperium of the United States and the Western alliance system relatively intact, in spite of 
the rise of new poles of economic growth and political influence in East Asia and elsewhere. 
The military–industrial complexes of the Western powers were indeed reinvigorated through 
technological innovation and new military doctrines justifying the deployment of hi-tech 
weapons (the so-called Revolution in Military Affairs). At the same time, capitalism expanded 
its global reach into former communist as well as developing countries, dismantled many of 
the regulatory barriers which had curbed its excesses, as well as rolling back the protective 
framework of the welfare state in the industrial countries and increasingly rewriting 
development according to a free-market or neoliberal script. 
 
A process of creative (and sometimes not so creative) destruction was unleashed in the 
former communist bloc and in swathes of the developing world. The impacts of political and 
economic liberalisation were most tangible in Eastern Europe, where they were reinforced by 
realignment into the Western alliance system and the European Union (EU). Even so there 
were intense and sometimes violent struggles to fill the political spaces vacated by 
dismantled communist regimes, especially in former Yugoslavia and around the fringes of the 
former Soviet Union, as in Bosnia, Chechnya, Georgia and now Ukraine. Military regimes 
withdrew or were displaced in many places in the developing world, especially Latin America, 
South-East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa. In some cases they gave way to gradually 
consolidating democracies. In others new forms of autocracy or illiberal governance were 
concocted in democratic drag. And in others again democratisation ushered in a transition 
                                               
14 For early and highly prescient analyses see the contributions to White and Wade (1984), as well as White (1993) on China.  
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not to democracy, but to state fragility and sustained political violence. These upheavals not 
only unsettled international security, they had tangible impacts, many of them destructive, 
upon the everyday lives of masses of people.  
1.2 The international agenda for peace, security and 
development  
The above was the contested terrain in which the UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-
Ghali published An Agenda for Peace (1992), aiming to carve out a more active role for the 
United Nations in peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention. This was accompanied by a 
key discursive shift from the language of state and international security to that of human and 
citizen security.15 In principle, human security prioritised the individuals and communities who 
were secured rather than the agendas of the international bodies, states and security 
apparatuses charged with delivering security to them. It readily connected to poverty 
alleviation and to the Millennium Development Goals, which became the centrepiece of 
development analysis and practice. It also drew support from an expanding research 
literature, which characterised violent conflict as development in reverse, and explored its 
multiple linkages to other causes of human misery, including poverty, inequality, famine, 
disease and environmental stresses (see Collier et al. 2003; Collier 2004 and Hoeffler and 
Reynal-Querol 2003).  
 
The UN’s An Agenda for Peace and a series of UN initiatives that followed did indeed pave 
the way for significant changes in the policy and practice of peacebuilding. There were 
increases in both UN and non-UN peace support operations – more or less threefold 
compared with the Cold War era. Their mandates extended well beyond traditional 
peacekeeping tasks, involving more robust terms of engagement along with extensive 
cooperation with civilian humanitarian and development agencies. Preventive diplomacy was 
boosted, including many more mediation and peace missions, which involved not just the UN 
but also regional and sub-regional organisations like the Organization of American States, 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations, African Union, South African Development 
Community and Economic Community of West African States.  
 
Moreover, donor agencies such as the Department for International Development (DFID) and 
international development bodies like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) and the World Bank began to take a much more active interest in 
questions of peace and security. A range of new policy instruments were added to the donor 
arsenal, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR), security sector 
reform (SSR) and access to justice programmes, becoming collectively a major growth 
industry in their own right. Military establishments upgraded their capacity to undertake ‘out 
of area’ and peace enforcement operations – and at the same time incorporated 
development concerns in their Civil–Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and counterinsurgency 
(COIN) programmes. The stabilisation of ‘fragile’ states, post-conflict state-building and 
support for ‘inclusive enough’ political coalitions and durable ‘political settlements’ have 
become ever more pressing concerns to the donor community (see Marquette and Beswick 
2011; DFID 2010; OECD 2008; CCOE 2012; UNDPKO 2012). The World Bank’s 2011 report 
on conflict, security and development brought many of these themes together and marked 
the final arrival of security at the centre of the theory and practice of development. 
 
Peacebuilding and humanitarian intervention have been underpinned by a growing body of 
analysis of the ‘new’, ‘networked’ or ‘asymmetric’ wars that brought insecurity, poverty, 
                                               
15 Although there was already a growing academic and policy literature on non-state forms of security, the UNDP (1994) played 
an especially crucial role in systematising the concept and introducing it into international development thinking. See also Ogata 
and Sen (2003) Jolly and Basu Ray (2007) and Kaldor (2007).   
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famine and disease in their wake.16 How far these wars are really ‘new’, how much they differ 
from previous wars, whether they have brought significant increases in violence and whether 
their human and developmental costs have been any greater than the armed conflicts of the 
Cold War era, have all been disputed.17 Recent studies indeed suggest that – despite a peak 
in violent conflicts immediately after the end of the Cold War – the long run trend has been a 
decline both in the number of wars and in overall casualties despite some short-term and 
regional variations.18 But in some ways such debates about whether the burden of violent 
conflict was increasing or decreasing have been beside the point. What mattered was that 
conflict and insecurity – together with their human and development costs – were put firmly in 
the policy frame of the major donors, international agencies and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), thus according them the priority they arguably deserved all along. 
Some indeed have argued that the overall decline in violent conflicts since the end of the 
Cold War is evidence that the UN’s An Agenda for Peace and the embrace of security 
concerns by the development community have on balance worked, despite all the setbacks 
and controversy along the way.19  
 
But this optimistic picture is still not easy to square with the evidence on the ground. Deadly 
conflicts continue in Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Somalia and new ones have sprung up 
in Syria, Libya, Mali, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. It is arguable in some of 
these cases that enforced or negotiated peace itself has proved almost as deadly as war. 
International peacebuilding has brought an end to open conflict but perpetuated structural 
violence in countries like Kosovo, Timor Leste and the DRC. In the latter, the largest UN 
peacekeeping operation has stabilised a rotten regime at the centre, but been unable to 
prevent simmering violence in the country’s Eastern periphery. Even in countries like 
Mozambique, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone or Nepal, where peacebuilding has ‘worked’ 
there are still not enough tangible benefits in terms of better governance and development to 
be sure that peace is durable over the longer run. At the same time, new tides of political and 
criminal violence have been sweeping into countries previously considered stable, like 
Mexico or Kenya. 
 
In sum, there seems to be something of a disjuncture between the goals of international 
engagement and the messy politics of how they translate into practice – or often don’t. This 
disjuncture raises fundamental questions about the entire security and development 
enterprise itself. For the latter tends to externalise the sources of insecurity by framing them 
in terms primarily of violent conflict and state fragility in the developing South and post-
communist East. In so doing it tends to deal with symptoms more than causes, including the 
fundamental global and national inequalities, which make people insecure. Not enough 
attention is devoted to global drivers of insecurity and how these impact on poor countries 
and vulnerable people: for instance, through international marketplaces for high value 
commodities and weapons; through international military interventions and shifting rivalries 
among existing and rising powers; through regime and militant violence spreading mass 
displacement of people within and across national boundaries; through imposed adjustment 
to economic shocks; or through climate change, famine and epidemics. Such neglect is 
hardly surprising. Directly confronting the global sources of insecurity is not only enormously 
complex; it is fraught with enormous political difficulty, since it almost invariably involves 
challenges to the major global centres of power and profit. 
                                               
16 On ‘new wars’ see Kaldor (1999), Dufflield (2001) and Munkler (2005), although they each offer rather different analytical 
takes.  
17 Critical analyses of new wars include Kalyvas (2001) and Newman (2004). 
18 As analysed by Human Security Report Project (2013); Pinker (2011); Themner and Wallensteen (2013). For an 
anthropological interpretation of crises and long-term trends see Vigh (2008). 
19 See Human Security Report Project (2013) and within a broader framing of the reasons for the reduction in violence Pinker 
(2011). 
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1.3 Two ‘regimes of truth’: liberal peace or securitisation? 
Figure 1.3 depicts how critical analysts have reframed the security–development–human 
freedom nexus. It offers a pointed contrast to the international community’s more benign 
triangle summarised in Figure 1.1. In the critical view, the ‘securitisation’ of development, 
harnesses development policy and practice to the security interests of global powers, as well 
as to those of elites in developing countries themselves.20 The mutually reinforcing 
relationship between security, development and freedom adds up to little more than poor 
relief (delivered in the form of humanitarian and development assistance) and riot control (via 
the stabilisation of fragile states).21 The international ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) those 
who are exposed to extreme violence (often by their own governments) simply lends 
legitimacy to international military interventions. These interventions impose double 
punishment on the poor, who bear the main burden of these interventions and of sanctions 
imposed on their governments. Promotion of democracy, good governance and human rights 
in practice is flawed by double standards – being subordinated to alternative international 
agendas, including the wars on terror and drugs. Conflict prevention and peacebuilding can 
sometimes establish a temporary peace. But this peace is seldom durable, and can all too 
easily segue into peace enforcement and counterinsurgency.  
Figure 1.3  The securitisation of development  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These two contrasting narratives are spelt out further in Table 1.1. Although they have 
divergent implications for the policy and practice of development, neither can claim a 
monopoly of truth. Instead, how they interrelate to each other is much more interesting, as 
will be argued below. 
 
 
                                               
20 The most influential statement of this argument remains Duffield (2001), although there is now a substantial critical literature 
in this vein. 
21 The phrase ‘poor relief and riot control’ originates from Cox (1996) and has been used by Duffield (2001) among others to 
characterise the security–development nexus. 
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Table 1.1  Two narratives of international engagement: liberal peace or 
securitisation? 
Liberal peace Securitisation 
Security, development and human 
freedom  
Poor relief and riot control  
The ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P)22 Double standards: ‘the right to punish’23  
Humanitarian intervention Hegemonic ‘new humanitarianism’24 
Democratisation, good governance Democracy promotion by force 
Human rights, human security Privatisation, property rights, corporate security  
Peacebuilding, statebuilding, stabilisation, 
political settlements 
Counterinsurgency; wars on terror and drugs 
Multilateralism (UN, NATO, EU) Coalitions of the willing 
 
Put simply, the issue is how to prevent the otherwise worthy enterprises of development and 
peacebuilding from degenerating into poor relief and riot control. How can peacebuilders 
navigate the contested political terrain of peace and security at the same time as confronting 
the inequalities in wealth and power that security institutions are designed to protect? Exactly 
when and how are development and security policies and programmes mutually reinforcing? 
When instead do aid programmes merely feed a few hungry mouths and stabilisation 
programmes merely uphold corrupt and repressive regimes? How is it possible to ensure that 
humanitarian interventions are not co-opted by the major international players and do not 
expose vulnerable people to further cycles of violence? How can it be ensured that 
humanitarian and development programmes are kept sufficiently separate from security 
initiatives during situations of acute conflict, so that they do not degenerate just into 
counterinsurgency? 
 
The two narratives of international engagement are underpinned by two quite distinct 
approaches to the analysis of security and development, also summarised schematically in 
Table 1.2. The mainstream accounts, which predominate in the policy literature, are backed 
up by extensive cross-national research (Collier et al. 2003; Stewart 2008; Murshed and 
Tadjoeddin 2007). By and large they regard people and groups who engage in violence as 
rational actors responding to material opportunities and incentives.25 Development and 
material progress themselves are seen as the most powerful form of conflict prevention. 
State fragility is regarded as both a cause and an outcome of blocked development. It is also 
a major source of political violence. Conversely, security and public order are considered to 
be key prerequisites of development. Recent research and policy analysis has focused both 
on stabilisation programmes aimed at re-imposing security and on political settlements aimed 
at establishing institutions and creating durable forms of political order (Stabilisation Unit 
2014; Wilder 2010; Muggah and Jutersonke 2011; Hills 2011). Stabilisation shares some 
common ground with counterinsurgency, including the use of development programmes to 
‘win hearts and minds’, and thus implicitly with the security agendas of international bodies 
and global powers. 
 
A more critical stream of analysis26 (summarised on the right-hand side of Table 1.2) tends to 
see violent conflict as inherent in the development enterprise itself, arising from the 
accumulation strategies pursued by political and economic elites and their corporate allies 
                                               
22 ICISS (2001). 
23 Mamdani (2010). 
24 Duffield (2001). 
25 For critiques of the methodological assumptions of this research see Cramer (2002) and Cramer and Goodhand (2011). 
26 As represented in the work of scholars such as Booth (2005), Duffield (2001), Cramer (2007), Richards (1996), Richmond 
(2011, 2014), Selby (2013) and Watts (2012). 
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and international backers. It also tends to draw upon a somewhat different pool of research 
findings, much of it in the form of detailed case studies and ethnographies, in contrast to the 
large-n cross-national statistical studies often favoured by the mainstream. It harks back to a 
significant earlier tradition of analysis on structural violence (Galtung 1969),27 especially 
when focusing on vertical and horizontal inequalities as major determinants of conflict. It is 
not state fragility alone that is identified as the main source of insecurity, but also the state 
itself, especially when its security policies are repressive; its development programmes are 
top-down and extractive; and its structures are unresponsive to the needs of the poor and 
marginalised. In this perspective security and stability are not prioritised as ends in 
themselves. The focus is rather upon tackling the inequalities in wealth and power that lie at 
the root of conflicts. Instead of counting on international actors and national elites to change 
things, more emphasis is placed on the struggles and agency of those most exposed to 
poverty and violence (which will be returned to in more detail in Sections 5.3 and 5.4).  
Table 1.2  The development–security nexus: synergistic or contradictory? 
Development as conflict prevention ‘A violence called development’ 
Developmentisation of security Securitisation of development 
Conflict is development in reverse Conflict is a mode of accumulation 
Conflict destroys social capital Conflict is a potential site of innovation 
Violence stems from economic incentives Violence is structural and linked to inequality 
War economies distort formal economies War can revitalise informal economies 
Violence is increasingly identity-based Violent encounters with modernity polarise 
identities 
State fragility is a major source of 
insecurity and violent conflict 
‘Seeing like a state’ is itself a source of         
mal-development, inequality and violence 
National security and public order are 
preconditions for development 
National security consolidates the grip of 
military, political and economic elites 
Stabilisation and statebuilding Subaltern resistance and unruly politics  
Globalisation encourages both 
development and security 
Globalisation has a backlash; including 
networked, asymmetric wars 
 
                                               
27 See also Scott (1987, 1992) and Watts (2013). 
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2 Transforming the theory and practice of 
security 
2.1 The two faces of security 
Security is a highly necessary but also deeply problematic and contested concept. In 
principle, it is both a global and a national public good. Most of the things that international 
decision-makers, political and security elites and development practitioners do in its name 
are supposed to ensure the safety and welfare of citizens and human beings in a world of 
multiple challenges and threats. There is a tendency to slide from global, to national, to 
citizen and human security and back again, without much serious reflection on how they 
interconnect and on where tensions and contradictions lie hidden. Development agencies 
have too often plunged into security policies and programmes, without a clear enough 
understanding of where they might lead, who would benefit and how they might go wrong.  
 
There is a central tension between the two narratives of security referred to earlier and spelt 
out in more detail in Table 2.1. On the one hand, security can be seen (on the supply side) 
as a process of political and social ordering, territorially organised and kept in place globally 
as well as nationally through the authoritative discourses and practices of power, including 
socially sanctioned violence. Much like official or donor-driven development,28 it is a public 
good delivered in principle by states. Yet in a world where states and indeed the international 
order face sustained challenges, security is often kept in place also through alternative non-
state or ‘hybrid’ networks of violence and protection (Boege, Brown and Clements 2009; Mac 
Ginty 2010; Luckham and Kirk 2013a, 2013b). Moreover, security is far from being an 
unalloyed public good. It largely protects socially embedded power, established property 
relations and social privilege – and thus reinforces global, national and local inequalities.  
 
On the other hand, security can be seen (on the demand side and in the vernacular) as an 
entitlement of citizens and more widely human beings to protection from violence, abuses of 
rights and social injustice, along with other existential risks such as famine or disease. 
‘Security in the vernacular’ is used here rather than the interlinked conceptions of ‘human 
security’ and of ‘citizen security’ popularised by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) and the World Bank. Both human and citizen security have come under criticism for 
‘securitising’ development (viz. Table 1.1) by framing poverty, exclusion and vulnerability 
through security lenses,29 and thus paving the way for military interventions in the affairs of 
fragile states, even if the critique applies less to the concepts themselves than to how and by 
whom they have been deployed. Human and citizen security have tended to be tucked away 
in the conceptual toolboxes of development practitioners, humanitarian agencies and indeed 
intervention forces. ‘Security in the vernacular’ places greater stress on the understanding 
and agency of those who are secured. Furthermore, it highlights the transformative potential 
of security as an entitlement, which can be actively claimed by citizen groups, activists and 
social movements seeking redress for insecurity, exclusion and injustice.  
 
                                               
28 Viz. the critiques made from varying political and methodological stances of development as ‘seeing like a state’ (Scott 1998), 
as an ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 1990) and as the ‘tyranny of experts’ (Easterly 2014). 
29 See Duffield and Wadell (2004), who share a certain amount of ground with the critiques made by more mainstream analyses 
such as Paris (2001) of human security as being too widely defined to be a useful concept. Jolly and Basu Ray (2007) provide a 
strong defence of the concept and its relevance to development concerns.   
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Table 2.1  The two faces of security: a necessary but highly contested 
concept 
Supply side 
 
‘Seeing like a state’.30 Security as a 
process of political and social ordering 
maintained through authoritative 
discourses and practices of power  
Demand side 
 
‘Security in the vernacular’.31 Security as an 
entitlement of citizens and more widely 
human beings to protection from violence 
and other existential risks  
Political power, legitimate violence and 
public authority are of the essence, globally 
as well as nationally 
Security intertwines with other entitlements, 
including freedom from hunger and disease, 
protection from environmental hazards, etc. 
Security is territorially bounded within 
states, regions, urban spaces, local 
communities 
Security is ontological and tied to the 
construction of identities and of imagined 
communities  
Capable and accountable state and local 
institutions, notably security and justice 
institutions 
Rights, legitimacy and consent are central; the 
state is the problem as much as the solution  
‘Seeing like a corporation’;32 stabilising 
existing distributions of power and 
prosperity 
Transformation of conditions creating 
insecurity, including bad governance and social 
exclusion  
Inequality, including unequal security, tends 
to be inherent 
Social and political inclusion, in terms of 
gender, class, faiths, minorities, etc. 
Both states and the international community 
have a ‘responsibility to protect’: but how 
and to whom are they accountable? 
Who speaks security and to whom? The voices 
and the agency of the poor, vulnerable, 
marginalised and oppressed 
Collective action is essential yet politically 
contested and problematic, not least 
globally 
Security from below. Subaltern politics, social 
movements and civil society  
 
Both these faces of security have their underside, most obviously the first. ‘Seeing like a 
state’ even with the best of intentions can lead to the interests of citizens being sacrificed to 
an unbending vision of national security or of top-down development (as even in Nyerere’s 
Tanzania).33 It is also open to abuse – for instance, to prop up authoritarian regimes; to 
advance the interests of predatory elites; to impose exclusionary economic and social 
policies; to justify state secrecy and surveillance of citizens (even in established 
democracies); or to justify the hegemonies and military adventurism of major world powers. 
And it tends to be closely if complexly related to ‘seeing like a corporation’, most obviously in 
enclave economies, where privatised security arrangements in protected enclaves may 
indeed destabilise or weaken the state.34 
 
The deformations of security in the vernacular tend to be more hidden, but no less damaging 
– for instance, the submission of minorities to campaigns of exclusion and violence by 
populist majorities; forms of popular justice that violate the rights, dignity and safety of 
supposed perpetrators; or grass roots endorsement of ‘traditional’ or customary institutions, 
which perpetuate gender and other inequities. Moreover, it is perfectly possible that such 
                                               
30 See Scott (1998) and Ferguson (1990) on how state policies and programmes tend to diminish popular participation. 
31 As one often finds when claiming originality for a concept (Luckham and Kirk 2013a), searches made in the course of this 
paper came across other authors who have used the same term: see Bubandt (2005) and Jarvis and Lister (2013).  
32 See Ferguson (2005) on ‘seeing like an oil company’. 
 33 Tanzania’s disastrous villagisation policy is one of Scott’s (1998) most telling examples.  
34 Ferguson (2005) argues that there is an inherent tension between corporate security and seeing like a state, in that the 
protection of corporations in enclave or rentier economies is not only compatible with weak statehood, but may actively 
contribute to the latter. See also the extensive literature on resource-rich rentier states, for instance Kaldor, Karl and Said’s 
(2007) analysis of oil wars.  
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local-level insecurities may persist or even be aggravated even when a state, like India or 
Brazil, is considered to be stable or a locality is considered to be secure. 
 
Neither of these two faces of security can be considered without the other. The relationship 
between them is utterly crucial.  The capacity of states to protect their citizens is at the basis 
of the social contract (Leonard 2013; Leonard and Samantar 2011). That is, the rights and 
security of citizens and people are the bedrock of state and international security – or at least 
they should be. But these entitlements cannot be protected without some kind of social order, 
however achieved. And how and by whom social order is assured are both affairs of 
governance and vital concerns for everyone who lives under the leaky umbrella of political 
authority. Political stability, durable institutions, the rule of law and effective and accountable 
security apparatuses are not just desirable attributes of states but are also in many respects 
conditions of citizen security. However, they come at a price, not just in taxes, but also 
because citizens and their representatives have to remain vigilant to ensure their rights are 
not ignored, or even worse, violated by those who are supposed to protect them.  
 
In principle, the gap between security demand and security supply is mediated in the political 
marketplaces of democracy. But political marketplaces are highly imperfect, even in the so-
called advanced democracies, and democratic accountability hardly ever extends beyond 
national boundaries. International agencies and donors promote security sector reform 
programmes in post-conflict and transitional countries precisely in order to plug their 
democratic control deficits (Cawthra and Luckham 2003). But this tends to be a task of 
Sisyphus in political marketplaces where the currencies of power are patronage, corruption 
and outright violence (De Waal 2009), which both suborn and bypass the state and its formal 
security institutions. Moreover, it is not as if donors themselves are in any way accountable 
to those they are supposed to be delivering from poverty and violence. The democratic 
deficits of donor agencies along with international institutions, global corporations, major 
powers, peacekeepers and even international NGOs are vast, even if seldom sufficiently 
discussed.35 
2.2 The challenges of rethinking security in the vernacular 
How does security appear when turned on its head and looked at from the viewpoint of the 
people who are secured, including those who find themselves beyond the vanishing point of 
officially delivered security?36 The World Bank’s Voices of the Poor study identified personal 
safety and security as amongst the most pressing concerns of poor people themselves.37 
However, by pre-framing its questions around standardised categories (like ‘social exclusion’, 
‘gender’ and indeed ‘security’) it tended to undermine its own premise that people living in 
conditions of poverty are the true experts in poverty (Participate 2012: 4–6; Blattman and 
Miguel 2010). ‘Security in the vernacular’ in contrast underscores that those who are 
vulnerable and insecure are not just social categories but people, groups and communities 
who respond to, cope with and challenge the social conditions which make them vulnerable 
and insecure.  
 
Such an approach harmonises with recent shifts in analysis away from a narrow focus on the 
causation of civil wars, on the motivations of rebels and on the impacts on aggregate 
indicators of economic performance towards a more complex multi-causal, multi-level story.38 
                                               
35 See Autesserre (2014). Certain international NGOs, however, have been more open to critical reflection upon their mandates 
and relationships to the constituencies they serve than other international actors.  
36 Vanishing points, according to Nordstrom (2010: 163) ‘are the points where the normative (what should be) intersects with 
reality (what actually is)’. These vanishing points are defined by those who have the discursive power to do so, rendering large 
numbers of people (especially women) invisible as far as the state institutions and formal economies are concerned.  
37 See Narayan et al. (1996: 2), where ‘security is lacking in the sense of both protection and peace of mind’ is identified as one 
of the most important concerns of poor people. 
38 As pioneered in the work of scholars like Kalyvas (2006), Cramer (2007) and Wood (2003). The Households in Conflict 
Network (HiCN) has assembled a wide range of studies of different local-level forms of violence: see 
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This broader approach recognises significant differences among forms of violence. And it 
focuses on how a wide range of people and groups engage in, are affected by and respond 
to these many violences, which in addition to civil wars include (Schultze-Kraft 2014; Scott-
Villiers et al. 2014; Ruteere et al. 2013; Gupte and Bogati 2014; Gupte, te Lintelo and Barnett 
2014; Oosterhoff, Mills and Osterom 2014): 
 
 Globally and regionally networked violence, linked to transnational ideologies, notably 
Islamic militancy (ISIS, Boko Haram, Al-Shabaab, etc.). 
 Transnational criminal violence linked to commerce in drugs and other high value 
goods, networking around states and reconfiguring established power relations 
(Central America, parts of West Africa, Afghanistan, etc.).  
 Organised one-sided state violence targeted against citizens, especially dissenters 
and minorities (Chechnya, Zimbabwe and in an extreme form North Korea; as well as 
Syria and Libya prior to the current upheavals). 
 Violence arising out of everyday encounters with both formal law enforcers (military, 
police) and informal authorities (traditional leaders, urban bosses, drug lords).    
 Violence subcontracted to paramilitaries, militias, mercenaries, etc. in unsecured 
borderlands (Sudan, Pakistan, Colombia, etc.). 
 Natural resource violence linked to youth exclusion, rent-seeking and crime (Niger 
Delta, Sierra Leone, DRC, Colombia). 
 Violence linked to ethnic cleansing, forced migration and human trafficking, as in the 
Balkans and currently in South-East Asia and the Mediterranean. 
 Agrarian revolts and peasant uprisings (Nepal, Peru, Zimbabwe and Mozambique).  
 Violence in urban spaces, linked to exclusion, lack of services, crime, failures of 
policing (Mumbai, Nairobi, Cape Town). 
 Recurring cycles of electoral and political violence (Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan). 
 Vigilantism and similar forms of community-based or religious enforcement.  
 Gender-based, domestic and homophobic violence, often linked to and reinforcing a 
range of other exclusions. 
 Structural or silent violence (Galtung 1969 and Watts 2013)39 – including the 
marginalisation from power and wealth of those who lack access to the means of 
violence. 
 
Not all these forms of violence fit within accepted definitions of civil war or even violent 
conflict. Some are networked across national and regional boundaries. Some are mutually 
interconnecting, as in the case of the multiple links between gender-based violence and 
other forms of violence. Local-level vigilantism and other community mechanisms for policing 
behaviour and punishing transgressions can sometimes create an enabling environment for 
far wider political and inter-communal violence, as in the Central African Republic (Lombard 
and Batianga-Kinzi 2015) and North-East Nigeria. Conversely, protracted state repression 
and violence targeted against citizens may create the conditions in which armed revolt and 
civil war ultimately become more likely, as in Syria and Libya. 
 
Ordinary people in these violent contexts experience, perceive and talk about security in 
ways that differ, sometimes radically, both from the dominant state security narratives, and 
indeed from universal conceptions of human and citizen security. Among the Acholi, for 
instance, piny maber (‘good surroundings’) has its own particular resonances of time and 
                                               
www.hicn.org/wordpress/?page_id=28. The majority of these have concentrated on their impacts upon development and 
poverty, rather than on the perceptions, resilience and agency of poor and vulnerable people – although more recent work has 
focused on the latter as well: viz. Justino (2015).   
39 The concept of structural violence (like the more capacious versions of human security) has been criticised for conceptual 
overstretch – aggregating a wide range of socioeconomic inequalities that may or may not be related to direct, physical 
violence, under a single conceptual umbrella. Yet it can usefully be narrowed down in the way suggested above – to forms of 
exclusion kept in place by the established structures of power, wealth, violence and, indeed, security.     
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place in the context of the violence in Northern Uganda.40 In Egypt the words amn and 
amaan are both used to denote security. The latter in particular includes notions of personal 
safety, which extend beyond conventional definitions of security. A recent study by Tadros 
(2015) found it was used to cover at least nine different forms of (in)security, amongst them 
security from state retribution and violence; absence of identity-based exclusion and 
discrimination; (among women) freedom from sexual harassment; everyday safety from 
criminal and terrorist violence; and hopes for the future including improved relationships 
among the country’s different faith communities. Absence of law and order, with the state 
described as ‘al dawla mekhala’a’ (‘disjointed like a piece of broken furniture’) during the 
upheavals of recent years, was a central fear expressed by many of those interviewed.  
 
In a multi-country study of local-level peacebuilding, Justino, Mitchell and Müller 
(forthcoming) found that definitions of ‘peace’ varied significantly between most men and 
most women. The majority of the participants in this study – women in particular – perceived 
peace beyond physical security, to encompass economic security, the absence of violence 
and tensions within the household and immediate social circles, and the ability to avoid local 
confrontations. Women defined peace around household concerns, with the most common 
requirements for ‘peace’ centred around the fulfilment of basic human rights: access to 
education, access to food, access to livelihood opportunities and the reduction of conflicts 
with spouses (including domestic violence) and within the family. Men’s definitions of peace 
often mentioned similar dimensions, but their priorities were more broadly defined, 
associating peace with community security, political stability at the regional and national 
level, and with infrastructure and livelihood development opportunities (in particular for 
younger men). This definition offered by male respondents is in line with common 
understandings of peace in international and national interventions around peacebuilding 
processes. The definitions put forward by women refer more to daily tangible welfare 
outcomes. 
 
Security is a central concern even for those who find themselves beyond the reach of the 
state and its security and justice agencies, seen as remote from their day-to-day concerns, or 
who actively avoid state agencies because they are seen as an oppressive presence. This is 
well captured in the language used by marginalised women labourers and sex-workers in 
South Kivu when they said ‘“hawatuoni sisi wafupi”, that they (big men, powerful people), 
don’t “see” us short people (the impoverished marginalised populations)’ (Kelly, King-Close 
and Perks 2014: 8).  
 
The security landscape of ‘short people’ tends to be inhabited not only by agents of state 
security, but also by powerful employers of their labour and many other actors. Some of 
these actors operate beyond the margins of state authority or indeed are violently opposed to 
it: warlords, religious militants, guerrillas, paramilitaries, mafias, vigilantes, traditional 
authorities, secret societies, community protection bodies and many others (Baker 2010; 
Hellweg 2009; Fanthorpe 2005; Jackson 2013). In sum, security along with justice and public 
authority is often negotiated outside the state rather than within it,41 and is characterised by 
various forms of hybrid security provision in which state and non-state security providers 
interact or indeed are hard to tell apart.42 This is the day-to-day reality, which great numbers 
of people have to live with, often at some cost to their own personal safety, rights and 
welfare.  
 
Indeed there is a veritable cacophony of vernaculars, strung together by many shared 
threads of history and webs of identity. A major challenge for researchers and policymakers 
                                               
40 As contrasted with the piny marac (‘bad surroundings’) of war and displacement according to Finnstrom (2008: 10–11).  
41 On negotiated state authority in African conflict situations see Hagmann and Péclard (2010). 
42 Boege et al. (2009), Mac Ginty (2010), Luckham and Kirk (2013b), Bagayoko and Luckham (forthcoming) and Meagher 
(2012), who in particular stresses the potentially violent and repressive dimensions of non-state security provision. 
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alike is how to listen and respond to the great variety of ways people navigate the terrains of 
war and violence and conceive their own security (Vigh 2006; Luckham and Kirk 2013a:    
17–19). They can now draw upon a much larger and more diverse array of empirical 
research than was available two or three decades ago (Burns 2012; Justino, Leavy and Valli 
2009; Chambers 2007; Nyamnjoh 2006). First of all there is a substantial pool of studies 
based upon participant observation and action research on how vulnerable people and 
groups are affected by and respond to violence-induced insecurity, impoverishment, disease 
and displacement (Leavy and Howard 2013; Justino et al. 2012a; McGee 2014). This is 
backed up by several quantitative studies including time series analyses based on livelihood 
and household surveys detailing how conflict and political violence affect the everyday lives 
of local people and communities.43 In addition, a range of in-depth ethnographic studies and 
local histories detail how particular groups navigate the terrains of war and peace: including 
studies of child soldiers, urban youths, women combatants, ‘bush wives’ and camp-followers; 
of refugees, displaced people and marginalised communities; of residents in urban 
neighbourhoods coping with gangs, drug dealing and ethnic or religious violence; of rebels, 
irregulars and ex-combatants; of vigilantes and informal, non-state policing and justice 
bodies.44  
 
Making sense of these diverse streams of research poses multiple challenges. First, the 
difficulty of triangulating findings from studies, which take different methodological routes, are 
of varying rigour and are linked to different analytical and policy concerns (Chambers 2007; 
McGee and Pearce 2009; Luckham and Kirk 2013b: 17–20). Moreover, vernacular narratives 
themselves are replete with their own biases, elisions and erasures. The growing number of 
studies of ex-combatants, rebels and other direct participants in violence provides valuable 
insights into why (mostly) men rebel and how they can be demobilised. Yet it privileges their 
viewpoint and may divert post-conflict funding from those in local communities who have not 
engaged in violence. The narratives of those who are most marginalised – for example, 
submerged minorities, victims of sexual violence, and women carers who have assumed the 
burdens of looking after the injured, sick, elderly and displaced (Justino et al. 2012b; McKay 
and Mazurana 2004) – tend to be harder to trace, all the more when silenced by violence 
itself.  
 
One must also reckon with the political and social biases of popular framings of security. 
Repressive national security policies or mano duro policing methods sometimes enjoy wide 
popular support, especially in conditions of political upheaval as in Egypt,45 or criminal 
violence as in a number of countries in Latin America. Popular policing of religious morality 
and lifestyle, be it by Islamist hisba (Berridge 2013; Adamu 2008) or charismatic churches, 
often fits within a context of state-approved curbs on the rights of women and intolerance of 
‘deviant’ sexuality. Popular prejudices and religious bigotry intertwine in assaults on the 
bodies, homes and livelihoods of minorities like the Yezidi in Iraq, Hazara in Afghanistan, or 
Rohingya in Myanmar. Deep-rooted conceptions of popular justice based on exemplary 
punishment of offenders can transform vigilantism into political violence when social order 
breaks down, as in the Central African Republic (Lombard and Batianga-Kinzi 2015). 
 
All this reinforces the case for better-informed, more realistic analyses of how ordinary 
people understand security, which take account of its multiple and frequently contradictory 
meanings. It is important to probe behind dominant understandings to uncover what Scott 
(1992) calls the ‘hidden transcripts’ of those most vulnerable to poverty, exploitation and 
                                               
43 Challenging the assumption that large-scale or rigorous large-n research is not possible in conflict-affected or insecure 
environments. See Justino et al. (2009); Justino (2015); Justino, Leone and Salardi (2013); Justino, Bruck and Verwimp (2013); 
Urdal and Hoelscher (2009).  
44 The ethnographic literature is substantial and growing. In sub-Saharan Africa alone it includes amongst several others: 
Richards (1996), Nordstrom (1997), Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers (2004), Vigh (2006), Coulter (2009), Veit (2010), Hoffman 
(2011). See also Bagayoko and Luckham (forthcoming), which draws on this ethnographic literature. 
45 As the study by Tadros (2015) already cited suggests. 
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violence. Often they have a better grasp of their own situation than is commonly supposed. A 
case in point is the sex-workers and other women working in and around artisanal mines in 
South Kivu referred to above, who formed the Association of Free Women, which helped 
them to gain access to health care, to withstand financial shocks and to receive social 
support from their peers (Kelly, King-Close and Perks 2014). Some marginalised groups, 
such as disenfranchised urban and rural youths in Nigeria, have channelled their energies 
into more explicitly ‘insurgent constructions’ (within ethnic militias, area boy associations, 
Yandaba, secret societies, cult groups and the like), which challenge yet often eventually 
come to reflect a corrupt public realm (Gore and Pratten 2003). (Boko Haram, issuing from 
similar disenfranchisement, may be a significant exception in making a sustained, highly 
visible and very violent challenge to the entire edifice of public and indeed religious authority 
in North-East Nigeria). 
 
Local knowledge is at the core of security in the vernacular. National and international 
policymakers ignore it at their peril. As Abramowitz has argued46 in regard to the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa, deep local understanding is needed for a whole range of reasons: to 
improve baseline data, including counting of the dead; to draw on actionable local ideas, for 
example about burial methods or reducing the risks of bodily contact; to tap local initiatives 
and capabilities; and to render visible the invisible power relations constraining or in 
alternatively facilitating collective action to contain the outbreak. Similar reasoning applies to 
security and justice provision, where questions of local ownership and community-led 
initiatives are at the forefront of policymaking, but for the most part remain unimplemented 
without much better understanding of local contexts.  
 
By itself, however, vernacular understanding is not enough. Whilst the dramas of insecurity 
and violence play out at grass roots, they are shaped to a significant extent by hierarchies of 
power, by political marketplaces and by economic transactions extending far beyond the 
local level. To be sure, those who face immiseration and insecurity in their own day-to-day 
lives may be well aware that their situation hangs on events and social forces far beyond 
their reach. All the more in a world in which the new media extend far and wide: to the 
legendary ‘Arab street’; to urban youths and social activists; to local elites and disaffected 
young people in small towns and remote villages; and indeed to the religious militants, armed 
insurgents and criminal elements exploiting the vulnerability of such groups.  
 
Yet rarely do those most at risk have access to the information and analytical tools that could 
make empirical or indeed political sense of these remote determinants of their insecurities. 
Their access to information and ability to mobilise for change is mediated by many 
gatekeepers – international media organisations; national and local elites, intelligence and 
propaganda apparatuses, the rumour mills of populist politicians and media outlets, the 
sermons and public pronouncements of clerics, imams and religious militants, the blogs and 
social media postings of social activists or, alternatively, those who advocate terror and 
exemplary violence. Very few of these are reliable interlocutors; mostly they frame insecurity 
through their own particular political frames; and seldom are they in any way accountable.  
 
There is a wide gap between this shared understanding that local, national and global 
insecurities somehow interconnect and our capacity to explain and communicate the variety 
of ways they do so. Not much of the research on the macro-level determinants of insecurity, 
such as natural resource dependence, poor governance, horizontal inequalities, or the 
commerce in small arms and drugs, spells out their impacts on the lives and livelihoods of 
vulnerable people, still less touches upon the latter’s own perceptions of their insecurity.  
                                               
46 Abramowitz 2015. However, she puts this forward as an argument for making better use of anthropological knowledge, rather 
than as a more specific case for bringing to bear the vernacular understandings of insecure people themselves. See also a 
more comprehensive analysis by Wilkinson and Leach (2015), which links the Ebola outbreak to issues of governance and 
structural violence.  
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And, conversely, not much of the micro-level research on how people are affected by and 
respond to insecurity traces the causal connections and lines of accountability back up to the 
national, still less global and regional levels.  
 
In the gaps in between these levels of explanation it is easy for what Autesserre (2012) calls 
‘dangerous narratives’ to flourish. On the one hand, these include causal stories that elevate 
one particular global determinant of insecurity, like conflicts over natural resources over 
others that may be more directly relevant to particular national and local circumstances. On 
the other hand, they encompass narratives, which privilege the plight of one particular set of 
local-level victims, for instance those experiencing sexual violence, over the determinants of 
the violence from which all suffer. Her point is not that either of these narratives is 
necessarily wrong. Rather it is that they tend to be given priority by international analysts and 
policymakers without serious enough empirical interrogation of how they play out in particular 
national and local contexts and who is most at risk. 
 
Filling these gaps raises serious methodological as well as policy issues. A multi-level 
approach is essential yet difficult, as it presents serious methodological as well as policy 
problems. It is notoriously difficult to shift register between different geographical and 
analytical scales. Vernacular understandings can only take us so far. In principle, the gaps 
could be filled by research, which makes a point of following the causal trail from local-level 
conflicts and insecurities to their wider national, regional and global determinants. But at 
some point these causal trails tend to run out or to become over-determined by the 
multiplicity of potential explanatory factors at each level.  
 
Relatively few studies in the existing research literature seriously attempt to spell out the 
empirical connections between local and national sources of conflict and security.47 Even 
fewer try to investigate the local–global or local–national–global interconnections.48 There is 
an apparent drought of participatory or ethnographic research linking insecurity in ordinary 
people’s lives to the global changes which shape it. A handful of studies, however, link local 
histories of conflict and insecurity to their national and global historical settings (Chauveau 
and Richards 2008; Vlassenroot and Kleipe 2013; North et al. 2012; Besley and Persson 
2011). Chauveau and Richards (2008), for instance, trace back divergent motivations of 
fighters in the civil wars in two specific regions in Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone to varying 
trajectories of agrarian change during the colonial and post-colonial periods, which in one 
case involved reliance upon migrant labour and in the other case created an excluded 
agrarian underclass (see also Cramer and Richards 2011).  
 
But until more empirical research becomes available, the best one can do is to make rough 
and ready reality checks, drawing upon what we know about the vernacular understandings 
and life situations of vulnerable and exploited people. For instance (to draw on examples 
already discussed), what would need to change nationally and globally as well as locally to 
better protect women who service the needs of men in Congolese mining villages; or Coptic 
Christians who face day-to-day threats to their personal safety; or members of the Hazara 
minority in Afghanistan who are at risk from sectarian and political violence? How can 
members of local communities impoverished or endangered by extractive industries, 
corporate support for paramilitaries or drug-based violence identify and insist on some 
accountability from the global architects as well as the local perpetrators of their insecurity? 
Are security sector reform programmes in fragile or post-conflict countries like DRC, Sierra 
Leone or Nepal designed so as to tangibly improve citizens’ day-to-day security, rather than 
merely financing the lifestyles of donor agencies and security elites? Do humanitarian 
                                               
47 Richards (1996), Wood (2003), Autesserre (2010), Veit (2010) and Hoffman (2011) are amongst those which do. 
48 Luckham (2009) and Hönke and Müller (2012) make the general case for spelling out these interconnections. For empirical 
examples, see de Waal (2014), Schlichte (2008), Briscoe (2014), McGee and Flórez López (2015 forthcoming) and Schultze-
Kraft (2014). 
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interventions undertaken under the banner of the ‘responsibility to protect’ actually protect 
the lives and livelihoods of vulnerable people in countries such as Afghanistan or Libya – or 
do they make them even more insecure? In principle, the answers to such questions should 
be evidence-based. But even where the evidence is incomplete or the links in local-to-
national-to-global causal chains cannot easily be traced, the questions are well worth posing.  
2.3 Identity-based violence, hierarchies of citizenship and the 
politics of inclusion 
Recent events in the Arab world, the Horn of Africa, the West African Sahel and elsewhere 
reinforce the importance of insecurities associated with what is termed identity-based 
conflict. According to the ‘new wars’ narrative, the mobilisation of ethnic, religious and 
sectarian identities can be seen as a response to the global dislocations outlined in Section 
1.1 (Kaldor 1999; Munkler 2005).49 People and groups fall back on their identities when their 
own cultural understandings of the world begin to fail them; when they are challenged by 
acute uncertainties about their safety and livelihoods; when states are unable to provide 
public goods including security; and when secular ideologies, including development itself, 
come under challenge.  
 
Persuasive as these arguments might seem, they are broad brush and still lack firm empirical 
support. We need much better understanding of how identities are negotiated at multiple 
levels (of gender, age, clan, tribe, caste, sect, faith, ethnicity, class, race and nation); of how 
they form the basis for ‘imagined communities’; of how they are deployed as political 
resources; and of how they become markers of security and signifiers for violence. 
 
Identities are jointly constructed as conceptual frames through which people construct their 
social selves and navigate their personal worlds and as discourses through which power is 
imagined and communicated. This duality governs how identities are mobilised for politics 
and violence. It also makes identities junction points at which vernacular and state-centred 
understandings of security both intersect and clash.  
 
On the one hand, identities are central to people’s sense of selfhood, bodily integrity, 
wellbeing and safety. They provide grammatical constructions through which people imagine 
their social worlds, articulate their fears, demarcate their security and respond to and 
sometimes organise for violence.50 On the other hand, identities are called upon by the 
powerful; they are written into the structures of nation states; and they form the basis for 
horizontal inequalities51 and establish hierarchies of citizenship. This duality is fundamental 
to an understanding of identity-based violence. Rather than being in any simple sense a 
‘cause’ of insecurity and violence in their own right, identities are fluid, socially constructed at 
multiple levels and open to manipulation, especially in conditions of rapid change and 
insecurity.  
 
Gender straddles both of these aspects of identity, of which it is a central building block. As 
described earlier, most women’s security priorities tend to be distinct from those of most 
men. Concerns over bodily integrity and personal safety from sexual harassment and sexual 
violence crop up again and again in research studies in many different national contexts.52 
More is at issue than sexual violence itself. Sexual violence diminishes the shared sense of 
citizenship, and connects to a range of other exclusions, for instance inequalities in women’s 
                                               
49 See also the critique by Kalyvas (2001). 
50 The analysis here draws both on Anderson (2006) and Enloe (1980). The latter provides a penetrating analysis of how 
governments and national security elites deploy ‘ethnic state security cognitive maps’ constructing identities as tools of national 
security.  
51 On horizontal inequalities see Stewart (2008); Brown and Langer (2010); Ostby (2007). 
52 Although it is not just a concern for women, as studies of male rape and sexual violence against members of LGBT 
communities have shown – Boesten (2014); Garcia-Moreno (2010). 
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access to land and other forms of property, inheritance rights, legal remedies, freedom of 
movement and political participation. It also tends to be especially prevalent when women 
and others begin to challenge the unwritten rules of society, for instance in times of political 
upheaval and war (Nordstrom 2010: 168–9). 
 
Gendered exclusions can also themselves function as markers of other cultural and political 
identities – being part of what is used to distinguish one particular religious faith, sect, ethnic 
group, caste or clan from others. Conversely, studies of sexual assault in war situations and 
in protest spaces describe how it is used as an instrument of intimidation and control (see 
Baaz and Stern 2009; Banwell 2014; Trenholm et al. 2013; Cummings 2011; Tonnessen 
2014; Branche and Virgili 2013 and Marks 2014)53 – to diminish, degrade and dehumanise 
not just women, but the nations, communities and faiths to which they belong.  
 
The use of sexual violence to intimidate and control is linked as well to the social 
construction of masculinity and its use to consolidate hierarchies of power and security. 
Nowhere is this more so than in military and security institutions themselves. These 
institutions tend to be the most highly gendered institutions of the state, in terms of their 
recruitment patterns, their bonding rituals, tolerance of sexual abuse and reinforcement of 
divisions of labour in which women are assigned marginalised support roles.54 A still 
enduring historical legacy of the forging of states through centuries of war-making has been 
the masculinisation of the entire fabric of state power and thus of state security. This 
masculinisation still profoundly shapes how state-delivered development as well as state-
delivered security is thought about and practised, especially in a world in which violence and 
its control remain key concerns of state and international policy. 
 
The relationships between masculinities, power and violence are by no means confined to 
states and their military and security institutions. Insurgent groups like Da’esh (ISIS) have 
recruited women and solicited their support for exclusive ideologies in which women’s 
subordination to the goals of Islamist and other struggles are openly pursued. By and large 
the literature on ‘non-state’ armed bodies suggests that they tend to be just as much focused 
around the violent appropriation of power, just as heavily gendered and if anything more 
prone to gender-based violence than their formal counterparts (Wood 2006; Weinstein 2006). 
All the more so, it seems, when these armed groups fight under the flag of religion or ethnic 
identity. It was once thought that armed liberation struggles were in contrast less prone to 
patriarchy, and indeed sometimes opened spaces for women’s participation. However, these 
spaces have tended to be transitory, as analyses of the re-marginalisation of women in post-
revolutionary situations like Eritrea have shown (Sörensen 1998). Moreover, post-conflict 
periods have often been marred by harsh legacies of increased domestic violence, further 
contributing to women’s re-marginalisation (Date-Bah 2003; Calderon, Gafaro and Ibanez 
2011).  
 
All the same, ethnic, religious, sectarian and other identities along with the ideologies 
assembled around them are not just conjured into being by opportunistic politicians, false 
prophets and war-mongers. They matter enormously to great numbers of people. If they did 
not matter, they would not translate into the currency of political power and could not be used 
to mobilise people into violence.55 Moreover, violence itself tends to solidify identities, 
translating people’s own ways of navigating their social worlds into fear and hatred of others. 
In Bosnia, Lebanon, Syria, Rwanda, Somalia and many other countries, intertwined 
                                               
53 On the deployment of sexual violence in protest contexts see Oosterhoff, Mills and Oosterom (2014) and Tadros (2015). 
54 The work of Enloe (2000, 2007) (see also Cohn 1993, 2003) has been especially insightful in calling attention to the 
interconnections between globalisation, militarism, masculinities and the gendered construction of security. 
55 The literature on identity-based conflict is extensive. A useful brief introduction to the issues is McLean Hilker (2009); see also 
Luckham, Moncrieffe and Harris (2006). Stewart (2009) compares ethnicity and religion as sources of mobilisation for politics 
and conflict. A comprehensive quantitative analysis of interconnections between inequality, identities and violent conflicts is to 
be found in Cederman, Gleditsch and Buhaug (2013).   
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communities, faiths, sects and clans, which have lived together, cooperated and sometimes 
intermarried, have found themselves cast into mutually reinforcing cycles of acute violence 
and insecurity.  
 
At the same time, identities are woven into the ways state power is asserted, the ways 
nations are imagined and the ways hierarchies of security and citizenship are formed within 
and between states. In the modern world citizenship is in principle inclusive, being 
constructed around equal rights and common security. In practice citizenship may involve 
various forms of state-sanctioned exclusion: against migrants and refugees; against faith 
groups who do not fully subscribe to secular conceptions of citizenship; against minorities 
like Rohingya in Burma, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Hazara in Afghanistan, Tibetans in China and 
Sunni Muslims in Iraq, who are seen as less fully citizens and less deserving of the 
protection of the state than members of ethnic, linguistic or religious majorities.  
 
Enloe has analysed how political and security elites in colonial states and in their post-
colonial successors have deployed ethnic and religious identities: to ensure the loyalty of 
their security apparatuses; to establish which citizens and groups can be trusted; and to 
demarcate those who are seen as potential threats.56 Ethnic profiling by the police, for 
example, is widespread even in relatively democratic and inclusive societies. Many 
authoritarian regimes hardwire exclusionary policies and practices into the framework of the 
state itself. Latent identity conflicts remain suppressed until the regimes begin to fracture, 
bringing the entire framework of public authority into question, as in Syria, Libya, ex-
Yugoslavia or early 1990s Somalia. Nevertheless, identity politics, hierarchies of citizenship 
and exclusionary security policies are also present in many democracies, such as Malaysia, 
Nigeria and Sri Lanka, becoming especially oppressive when combined with majoritarian 
politics, which has a built-in tendency to discount the rights and aspirations of minorities.57  
 
It is not states on their own that establish hierarchies of unequal citizenship and security. 
These hierarchies also tend to be historically rooted in long-term horizontal inequalities 
(Nyamnjoh 2006; Brown and Langer 2010). They often have active champions rooted deep 
in civil society, be they Buddhist monks, Islamic clerics or militant secularists refusing to 
respect differences. Hierarchies and webs of identity extend down to the most local level. 
They tend to be embedded in traditional structures and in hybrid forms of security provision, 
like customary courts, non-state policing, vigilantes and community protection bodies, which 
tend to be better at protecting the rights of local elites than minorities or migrant ‘strangers’ 
(Bagayoko and Luckham forthcoming). Governments and ruling elites subcontract violence 
to ethnic, regional and sectarian militias when they face local rebellion and their own security 
forces are insufficient or fail as in Sudan or Iraq – with notably divisive and violent 
consequences.58   
 
How people experience violence and insecurity is thus shaped by constantly evolving 
patterns of social differentiation, including gender, age, class, locality, religion, ethnicity, race, 
etc. – and by the ways that these are transformed by violence itself. Multiple intersecting 
identities influence how people and groups perceive, cope with and mitigate their insecurity. 
The reality is that the benefits of security and the burdens of insecurity tend to be unequally 
shared. Those who feel most marginalised tend to lack the quality and substance of 
citizenship, as well as being most exposed to violence.  
 
These intersections between multiple identities, exclusion and violence are explored by a 
growing body of empirical research (Tadros 2012a, 2012b; Oosterom 2014; Oosterom and 
Lloyd 2014; Scott-Villiers et al. 2014): for instance, on the interactions between religious 
                                               
56 Enloe (1980) remains just as pertinent now on the ethnic politics of states and their security bureaucracies as it was in 1980.  
57 As analysed by Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor (2003); and Luckham (2011). 
58 In Iraq the replacement of the fractured army by Iranian-backed Hashd al-Shaabi Shia militias is bound to make the campaign 
against Da’esh even more divisive and likely to alienate Sunnis.  
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identity and age in Egypt; on the everyday experience of sexual and other violence by 
women belonging to marginalised ethnicities in South Sudan; on Zimbabwean youths who 
are disproportionately both the targets and perpetrators of political violence; and on ethnic 
groups that have found themselves marginalised in Kenya’s post-colonial political settlement, 
being exposed to ongoing violence over cattle and land, as well as deprived of public 
services including state protection and responsiveness to violent incidents.  
 
Identities tend also to be woven into how state power is contested by subaltern groups. 
Decentralised webs of solidarity work across and around the formal structures of the state, 
and can be drawn upon to challenge it in times of crisis. They can also connect local pockets 
of dissent to wider national and indeed global networks. Links between diasporas and local 
communities have sustained many an insurgency. But they have also been used to broker 
peace, to channel remittances and to finance local development activities in unstable 
environments. Armed movements and sectarian or ethnic militias, like Hezbollah in Lebanon, 
the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Houthi militias in Yemen, Da’esh in Iraq and Syria, 
shifting coalitions of Tuareg and Islamist fighters in Mali and the Sahel, or until recently the 
LTTE in Sri Lanka, have drawn upon them to mobilise support, define the targets of their 
violence and assert control over people and territory.  
 
Identities can also become the sociopolitical frame for transnationally or regionally networked 
violence. Much indeed has been made of the globalised networks, which link militants to 
terrorism, international crime and other international security threats. Religion, for instance 
Salafist versions of Islam, has spun the ideological threads that are stitching militant 
networks together. Religion in general (and not just political Islam) is arguably unique 
amongst markers of identity in its claims to universality – making it easier for militants to 
forge alliances across regions and continents and to challenge secular conceptions of 
citizenship in a variety of different national contexts.59 It tends to be all the more powerful 
because it can inflect other grievances and provide a language through which conceptions of 
violated social justice can be translated into calls for political action and be used to justify 
violence.  
 
Yet one must be highly cautious about elevating the ideological constructs of particular 
militant groups into wider threats that have any serious global traction. Too much attention 
has been paid to the dramatisation of extreme violence in the social media to intimidate and 
recruit. Stereotypes flourish and Muslims in particular find themselves demonised.60 
Moreover, the propaganda of the violent deed is as much practised by states, including 
global powers, as it is by terrorists.61  
 
Much of the militant violence is sectarian and has been directed against states, which 
themselves pursue deeply sectarian agendas as well, as in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon. Above 
all, one should not forget that the main victims of militant violence are not the citizens of 
Western states, but the civilian populations that extremists target and the minority groups, 
whose history and peoples they seek to obliterate,62 like the Yezidi in Iraq, Hazara in 
Afghanistan or Sufis and Christians in Pakistan and parts of the Middle East.  
 
Hence sober assessment is required of the historical situations in which trans-national 
networks arise and of what if anything holds them together. The alliances proclaimed by 
                                               
59 On the differences between ethnic and religious identities as the basis for political and conflict mobilisation see Stewart 
(2009).  
60 Mamdani (2004) provides an especially powerful statement of the case that Muslims are being unfairly demonised for 
violence. Moreover, Christian militias in the Balkans and Lebanon and Buddhist monks and militants in Sri Lanka and Burma 
have been deeply involved in identity-based violence – although their transnational links are perhaps less extensive than those 
of some Muslim militants.  
61 Viz. the dramaturgy of drone strikes against Bin Laden and other terrorists, as well as bombings of Da’esh-controlled areas in 
Syria. Both of the Gulf Wars and the intervention in Afghanistan were as much media as military campaigns. 
62 Not to speak of the large numbers of civilians who have been made victims of deliberately targeted killings, abductions and 
rape.  
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jihadis and other militants across regions and continents tend to run far ahead of any real 
capacity for joint operations. Flows of money, militants and weapons help to spread the fires 
of insurrection across whole regions, like the borderlands between Afghanistan, Pakistan and 
India, swathes of the Middle East and the Sahel. Yet the alliances stitched together among 
militant groups tend to be loose and riven by factional rivalries. Indeed these groups tend to 
thrive only when they can draw upon local histories, local grievances and local sources of 
power and support. Moreover, the violence is often sectarian or is directed against national 
and local structures of power, including the established structures of mainstream Islam.  
 
The recent Islamist rebellion in Mali and the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria are cases in 
point.63 They both fit within longer-term historical cycles of rural rebellion, Islamic jihad and 
contestation of political authority – as well articulating more recent discontents arising from 
youth unemployment and marginalisation. They feed on established patterns of cross-border 
migration, smuggling and commerce. In the Malian case these cross-border collaborations 
are shaped as well by the elaborate social networks and clan structures of Touareg 
pastoralists. There are also links to organised crime, including the trans-national trades in 
tobacco and latterly narcotic drugs across the Sahara. In both countries government 
responses to the rebellions have been badly organised, unduly repressive and casually 
negligent of the safety and welfare of the civilians caught up in the violence – fitting into 
longer established patterns of state violence, corruption and neglect. Rebel violence in its 
turn has torn apart local support networks, clan structures and social institutions – ultimately 
also undermining the rebels’ own legitimacy and public support. 
 
What then can be done to create a politics of inclusion to overcome the patterns of exclusion 
that identity-based conflicts arise from and reinforce? In principle, security should be 
organised as a positive sum game so as to overcome rather than reinforce security dilemmas 
in which one group’s cohesion and safety becomes another’s exclusion and insecurity. But 
precisely how and through what processes is the issue in societies characterised by 
profound inequalities and hierarchies of citizenship, in which identities are woven deep into 
the existing structures of power and wealth and have been hardened in the furnace of 
violence itself.   
 
The World Development Report 2011 proposes that security should be built around ‘inclusive 
enough coalitions’ (among elites, but also between elites and citizens) factored into political 
settlements. But it is not up to international bodies to forge these coalitions, nor even to offer 
prescriptive advice about how to create a politics of inclusion. A substantial but largely 
inconclusive literature inquires how democratic constitutions can be designed so as to 
channel identity politics into democratic competition rather than violent conflict.64 All too 
often, however, such attempts at constitutional engineering come to grief, either because 
they are co-opted around the centralising projects of ruling elites (like Ethiopia’s experiment 
in ethnic federalism), or because they remain hopelessly at variance with realities of ethnic or 
sectarian politics on the ground.   
 
The problems of creating more inclusive imagined national communities have tended to be 
especially tricky where previous projects of secular nation-building have degenerated into fig 
leaves for despotism or come unstitched under the pressure of new and more divisive and 
violent forms of political mobilisation, as in the Balkans and the Middle East. There are very 
few truly convincing national exemplars of what a politics of inclusion based on recognition of 
past wrongs and respect for diversity could look like, although countries like South Africa, 
Somaliland or Bolivia (each with their own distinct problems and legacies of social division 
and violence) come close. Yet the achievements of even these countries are open to 
challenge, are reversible, and remain in need of constant democratic vigilance.
                                               
63 As Lind (2015) argues. See also the analysis of Al-Shabaab in Kenya in Lind, Mutahi and Oosterom (2015). 
64 For an analysis see Luckham et al. (2003). 
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3  Shifting cartographies of risk: multilayered, 
interconnecting insecurities 
 
As we have seen, those who speak security ‘in the vernacular’ face many kinds of insecurity. 
Their insecurity intertwines with many other forms of human suffering and social exclusion. 
They do not necessarily make sharp distinctions between their hunger, their exposure to 
disease, their displacement from their homes and their everyday experiences of violence. 
Nor always do those responsible for their insecurity insist on such distinctions; sometimes 
indeed the reverse, as with the criminal mafias who extract profits from their control of 
security in urban slums and rural peripheries; or the religious militants who use extreme force 
to obstruct polio vaccinations or block women’s education in Pakistan or North-East Nigeria.  
 
Although the main focus of this paper is upon freedom from violence and from the fear of 
violence, it situates this within a wider consideration of the links to other dimensions of 
human security. Nevertheless, taking an expansive approach has its dangers (see Paris 
2001 and Christie 2010).65 It can lead to a lack of clarity by mixing a smorgasbord of global 
problems on the same analytical dish. It hazards the securitisation of other forms of risk, by 
opening the door to the reframing of global poverty, pandemics, climate change and so forth 
through the lenses of national and international security policy. But such dangers are best 
avoided by spelling out, rather than obscuring, the interconnections, and by opening them to 
empirical analysis.  
 
Table 3.1 presents a schematic landscape of different forms of insecurity and risk, as well as 
the different levels, from the local to the global, at which they tend to be most pressing. The 
starting point for this paper’s interrogation of security in the vernacular has been the 
violences and insecurities at the local level having the most tangible impacts on people’s 
day-to-day lives and these are summarised at the bottom of the table. Yet these local 
insecurities are determined in part by remote processes and events at national, regional and 
global levels, which local people (and indeed many development practitioners) scarcely 
understand and have little ability to control. At the same time, even apparently local as well 
as national insecurities can have major global reverberations: as with local-level Islamist 
violence in the Horn of Africa and the Sahel; or the political and military upheavals which 
propel large numbers of Africans and Middle Easterners to seek refuge across the 
Mediterranean; or the worldwide panic aroused by the Ebola epidemic.    
 
It is not the job of this paper to scrutinise links between, say, unregulated capitalism, fossil 
fuel extraction and climate change, or to offer speculations about how desertification and 
water loss might lead to resource wars66 – however ripe these may be for further 
investigation. What it does point to, however, is the need to integrate a broad spectrum of 
global, regional and national risks into the analysis of violence and insecurity, even at the 
most local level. It could be that global economic shocks and donor-imposed austerity 
programmes are more important determinants of insecurity than political violence, 
international interventions, regional rivalries or state fragility. Conversely, countries and 
societies, whose economic and social infrastructures have been torn apart by war are more 
likely to be vulnerable to economic shocks. In sum, there are complex interactions among 
economic, security and sustainability risks, which vary from situation to situation.  
                                               
65 A robust defence of an expansive approach to human security is provided by Jolly and Basu Ray (2007). 
66 For varying takes on the links between climate change, resource depletion and (in)security see Homer Dixon (1994); the 
critique by Fairhead (2001), Schubert et al. (2008) and Seide and Lind (2013).  
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Table 3.1   The complex landscape of risk and (in)security 
The multiple 
layers of 
(in)security 
Violence and threats 
of violence 
Economic 
dislocations 
Sustainability risks 
Global Muscular geopolitics 
and humanitarian 
military intervention 
 
New technologies of 
war, surveillance and 
communications 
 
Globally networked 
violence: terrorism, 
drugs, crime 
Ungoverned capitalism 
 
Global financial and 
economic shocks 
 
Widening global 
inequalities 
Unchecked climate 
change 
 
Health pandemics 
(HIV, Ebola, etc.) 
 
Food insecurity 
 
Dwindling water 
supplies 
North–South 
South–South 
and regional 
Rising powers 
 
Insecurity ‘blowback’ 
to North 
 
Regional conflict 
complexes 
Varying regional and 
national capacities to 
weather shocks  
 
Brunt of adjustments 
imposed on poorest 
countries and people 
Competition over 
water, land, resources 
 
Mass population 
displacements, 
refugees, migration  
National Unravelling political 
settlements 
 
Contested 
monopolies of 
violence 
 
Violent, ungoverned 
borderlands 
Weak states unable to 
manage dependent, 
‘adjusted’ economies 
 
Growing vertical and 
horizontal inequalities  
‘Complex 
humanitarian 
emergencies’ 
 
Weak states unable to 
respond to 
emergencies or 
create safety nets 
Community 
and individual  
Proliferation of non-
state armed groups  
 
Gender, identity-
based, agrarian, 
urban, criminal, 
vigilante, etc. 
violences 
Uneven impacts of 
development 
 
Inequality, poverty, 
uncertain livelihoods 
Famine, epidemics, 
child mortality, 
displacement 
 
Uneven distribution of 
risks between rich 
and poor  
 
There has been a tendency to label economic dislocations and sustainability risks as 
‘security threats’ in their own right, which demand the urgent attention of security decision-
makers in the UN and elsewhere. There has also been a propensity to scale up essentially 
local or regional threats, like those of Islamic militancy in the Sahel, the Arabian Peninsula or 
the Afghanistan–Pakistan borderlands, to build cases for international military action. 
Problems are often labelled as clear and present threats to security rather than longer-term 
problems demanding concerted action by a wide range of stakeholders, so as to rescue them 
from the deep silos of interminable international negotiations or the pits of national inertia. 
But securitising them in these ways tends to harness them still further to the interests and 
33 
 
security priorities of major international players, including powerful governments and 
corporations – not to speak of aggravating rather than solving the underlying problems.67  
 
Furthermore, risks tend to be politically and socially constructed. They often reflect and 
reproduce current distributions of power, of bureaucratic authority and of knowledge, none 
more so than security threats. The discourse of threats evokes a narrow narrative of violent 
contestation, in which the bodies of citizens become as one with the body politic of the state. 
This allows powerful actors and institutions to close down analysis and policy around 
particular framings of risk, especially those which emphasise the maintenance of stability and 
control.68 Yet most risks (including security risks) are complex, fluid and far from 
homogeneous in their time horizons, stochastic distributions, and what or who is most at risk. 
Slow-burning risks with a high likelihood of ultimately disastrous outcomes, like climate 
change, differ from tail-end (or Black Swan) risks with less probable yet catastrophic 
outcomes, such as nuclear accidents or the sudden disintegration of apparently stable 
authoritarian regimes. In either case, standard policy templates don’t always fit and may 
quickly be rendered irrelevant by changing realities on the ground.  
 
Moreover, the fundamental question remains: whose risks exactly are they? According to the 
prevailing state-focused (or supply-side) discourse considered earlier, it is states and the 
systems of order protected by states, which must be protected. According to the demand 
side or vernacular conception of security, which is the starting point of this paper (and is 
represented in the bottom section of Table 3.1), it is ordinary people who should be 
protected, but seldom are. It is upon them that the burden of risk tends to be greatest and 
most oppressive. It is their culturally shaped perceptions of risk which count.69 It is upon their 
resilience and agency that coping strategies depend. And it is they who can begin to 
challenge the dominant framings of security and initiate and support demands for change.  
 
                                               
67 On the pitfalls of the securitisation of health, for instance, see Elbe (2010) and de Waal et al. (2014) on the interconnections 
between health and violence in Darfur. 
68 See Leach, Scoones and Stirling (2010) where this case is persuasively argued in regard to the management of risks like 
epidemics, food security, water shortages and climate change. Much the same reasoning would apply to the dominant framings 
of security. 
69 On the importance of culture in the framing of risks see IFRC (2014). 
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4 Catching the winds of change 
 
In Sections 1.1 and 1.2 it was argued that the development–security–human freedom nexus 
is the product of a particular historical era, being organically linked to Western hegemony 
and free-market capitalism. Not only is that nexus historically contingent and riddled with 
contradictions, it is being pulled apart by the gathering winds of change, as summarised in 
Figure 4.1.  
 
These winds of change will be difficult to navigate without better comprehension, however 
approximate, of where they are coming from, how they are shifting, and what risks and 
opportunities they open. Both the security and the development landscapes are likely to be 
reconfigured through the emergence of new centres of capital accumulation, economic 
growth and political power, including the BRICS or ‘rising powers’ (Gu and McCluskey 2015; 
Xiaoyun and Carey 2014; Allouche and Lind 2014). This imminent shift towards a more plural 
and decentred world order poses immense potential policy challenges. Whether and how it 
can break the deadlock maintained up to now by major powers and corporate interests is still 
unresolved. If the impasse is eventually breached, spaces might open for the renegotiation of 
a wide range of global issues, like environmental sustainability and systemic inequalities as 
well as the dominant security architecture. 
Figure 4.1  Catching the winds of change as they shift 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 Global shifts in profit, force and power 
The emergence of new growth poles and of the rising powers potentially challenges the 
entire business model around which the current global security marketplace is constructed. 
The demise of American hegemony has long been predicted, even if the predictions have 
often been over-egged. Yet there are signs that the supposedly unipolar world order that 
emerged after the end of the Cold War is beginning to crack, not least in the security domain. 
The US and NATO’s still massive advantages in military force no longer assure unchallenged 
strategic preponderance, notably when confronting asymmetric challenges in the South. 
There is a widening gap between their military capabilities and their ability to determine 
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events on the ground, as events in places like Somalia, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and 
Libya have shown. Even so, the US in particular and the West in general dispose of a vast 
repertoire of other forms of influence, including the ability to marshal information and bend 
the international legal framework, which to a considerable extent offset their strategic 
weaknesses. 
 
These global shifts pose serious problems, but also potentially open significant opportunities 
to transform an international security framework, which has remained disproportionately 
weighted in favour of the US and its allies.70 The major powers are becoming more cautious 
about launching large-scale military interventions, especially those which put boots on the 
ground (although there is less caution when it comes to air strikes and drones targeting 
militants and terrorists). There is a discernible trend towards international support for regional 
and South–South initiatives on regional peacekeeping, human rights and security sector 
governance. It is arguable that the West’s security, counter-terrorist and anti-drug agendas 
are merely being subcontracted to regional partners; and that some of these regional 
partners, like Saudi Arabia, are pursuing their own particular hegemonic agendas. Even so, 
regionalisation can arguably begin to establish the infrastructure and capacities for more 
coordinated regionally and locally driven peacebuilding.  
 
Yet a more plural world order will not necessarily protect the limited peacebuilding 
achievements of the UN or tangibly increase the security of those at most risk from poverty 
and violence. The response of rising powers and many G7+ countries to the UN’s embrace 
of the Responsibility to Protect, of stabilisation and of security sector reform (SSR) initiatives 
and of proposals to adopt security amongst the Sustainable Development Goals, has been 
sceptical at best and in some cases downright hostile. The scepticism, especially about 
Western-promoted reform agendas, is in many respects well founded, parallelling the 
concerns raised by critics of liberal peace discussed in Section 1.3. But there is a risk it could 
also blight regional and national peacebuilding initiatives and undermine the efforts of 
citizens themselves to hold governments and their security agencies accountable for abuses 
of power and violations of human rights. Not least because the governments and elites of 
rising powers tend to defend their own national and corporate interests, to shut their ears to 
external criticism and to be wary of empowering their own citizens. For all these reasons 
change cannot be entrusted just to states, and it is only if they face concerted pressures from 
reform constituencies both within and across their national boundaries that they are likely to 
take the initiative. 
4.2 Privatisation and criminalisation of security  
The marketplaces for security and protection have always been highly political. At the same 
time they are shaped by global market forces – increasingly so indeed in times of recession 
and austerity. This marketisation of security provision is occurring in a multiplicity of ways71 
and reshapes how and for whose benefit security is delivered. Sales of weapons and military 
services continue to be jointly driven by foreign policy and by defence industry profits; but 
these profits are increasingly the dominant consideration. There has been large-scale 
expansion in private security companies globally and in the developing world. Privatisations 
have been occurring of policing, prisons and probation services in many national contexts. 
Natural resource corporations, media outlets and humanitarian agencies operating in 
insecure political environments have been contracting out their protection to private security 
firms, local militias and state security agencies. Consultancy firms (some with little previous 
experience of security matters) have been assuming responsibility for security sector and 
                                               
70 And also in favour of Russia, which is less hesitant both about putting boots on the ground of its neighbours and about 
providing military support to despotic allies like Syria.  
71 There is a substantial body of research and analysis on the privatisation of security provision: see Avant (2005), Abrahamsen 
and Williams (2007), Isima (2009), Nordstrom (2004) and Singer (2008).  
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justice reform programmes. Military contractors have been assuming core security and 
stabilisation functions in support of intervening powers in fractured states. And the 
governments of many such states have themselves been contracting out security provision, 
including the day-to-day business of repression in their troubled peripheries, to mercenaries, 
paramilitaries and ethnic militias.  
 
Almost invariably, as Avant (2005: 255) argues, private financing and delivery of security 
services redistributes power over force. Even if there are efficiency gains (and these are 
highly disputed), there tend to be significant long-term political costs. The privatisation of 
security tends to blur lines of responsibility; to undermine support for multilateral institutions; 
to reduce the need to work though political processes; and to weaken democratic 
accountability.  
 
Moreover, security has been privatised in a context in which criminal enterprise is becoming 
a major, if hidden, sector of the global economy in its own right – although its scale and 
penetration are exceedingly hard to estimate. Some refer to it as the dark side of 
globalisation and of neoliberalism; although others are more sceptical both about its scale 
and about its relationships to wider globalisation.72 Although international crime tends to be 
characterised by extremely high profit margins and very powerful incentive systems, these 
derive to a considerable extent from the collision between market forces and state or 
international regulation: bans imposed on narcotics, conflict diamonds, bunkered oil, 
plundered timber, counterfeit medicines, pirated brands, stolen patents, illegally shipped 
small arms and light weapons and so forth. The criminal networks formed to exploit these 
economic niches reinforce the broader tendency of both power and profit to work around and 
across the state rather than through and in support of it. 
 
Criminalisation has direct and indirect impacts on the shifting security landscape. It has 
become a major driver of violence, social dislocation and exclusion in its own right. Casualty 
levels and population displacements in countries like Mexico and Colombia approach and 
sometimes exceed those in war zones (Human Security Report Project 2013; World Bank 
2011; Schultze-Kraft 2014). Moreover, as the World Bank (2011: chapter 7) observes, it is a 
major external source of stress upon fragile and conflict-torn states. Or more accurately, it is 
internalised by these states themselves and becomes part of the way they function.73 It often 
fits into and reinforces existing patterns of rent-seeking and corruption. The distinction 
between licit and illicit appropriation of rents is difficult to make: why is the bunkering of 
stolen oil in Nigeria criminal and the vast web of state patronage fed by oil revenues not 
criminal?74 Criminal activities can also eat into the fabric of civil society, be it in the Niger 
Delta or Brazilian favelas. And they may intersect with other forms of networked violence as 
with the complex interface between various forms of illicit economic activity and Islamist 
networks in Afghanistan or Sahelian West Africa.  
 
The privatisation and criminalisation of security are not of course the same things, nor do 
they necessarily reinforce each other.75 Both, however, take place at the interface between 
market forces and state and international regulation. As potential sources of change and 
innovation, however, they tend to be deeply problematic, and can impose heavy burdens on 
those whose lives they make more insecure. To the extent that they loosen the framework of 
formal state authority, they may arguably open spaces for non-state or hybrid forms of non-
state security provision, which may better meet the needs of local people.76 More often, 
                                               
72 See on the one hand, Naim (2003); and on the other, Andreas (2011) for a more nuanced and sceptical view. 
73 As Schultze-Kraft (2013, 2014) points out. See also Bayart, Ellis and Hibou (1999). 
74 On the fuzziness of the distinction between illicit and licit appropriation of oil rents see Schultze-Kraft (2013). 
75 Indeed the logic of privatisation followed to its logical conclusion would lead to the legalisation of narcotics, undercutting the 
profit margins of organised crime. 
76 On hybrid security provision see Boege et al. (2009), Mac Ginty (2010) and Luckham and Kirk (2013b). Meagher (2012) 
provides a cogent critique. 
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however, they increase everyday violence, offer protection only to those best able to pay for 
it, and enable elites to enlist enfeebled and corrupted state security apparatuses as partners 
in their own predatory activities.  
4.3 New frontiers of technology and information 
Technologies are fast transforming the worlds of work and of consumption in ways that are 
hard to predict and are likely to be accompanied by major social and political dislocations. 
These will surely pose major security challenges, as well as shaping how ordinary people 
understand and respond to these challenges. More broadly, there is a constant struggle to 
appropriate knowledge and information and the new forms of power-knowledge they bring 
into being as technological frontiers continue to shift.  
 
The new technologies are already having impacts upon the security domain, shifting the 
margins of military advantage, and rewriting global inequalities in military power. On the one 
hand smart, high precision weapons systems brought in by the so-called Revolution in 
Military Affairs are introducing new forms of remote control warfare, which rely less on boots 
on the ground and assure the strategic preponderance of states enjoying comparative 
advantages in high technology. On the other hand, miniaturised technologies, portable 
weapons systems (like hand-held anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles) and new media fit well 
into the asymmetric strategies of insurgents and militants, enabling relatively small numbers 
of men with few inhibitions about inflicting civilian casualties to disrupt conventional security 
forces and control territory. 
 
Just as significant are the struggles to control information and shape discourse. Recent 
disclosures by Snowden, Assange and others reveal the vastly increased capacity of states 
and corporations to hoover up, store and process information about citizens and to place 
‘extremists’, dissidents and indeed legitimate protestors under surveillance77 – and in the 
case of corporations to exploit market niches and protect commercial confidentiality. But at 
the same time, new information technologies and the social media are expanding and 
globalising the capacity for networked information sharing and resistance to authority. State 
security bureaucracies, especially but not only those in authoritarian systems, block 
websites, shut off access to social media, hack into communications and build their 
capacities for cyber warfare. Citizens, dissidents and hacktivists do what they can to evade, 
work around and subvert them. The use of citizen journalism and the social media to monitor 
security agencies, document human rights abuses and oppose violence will be returned to in 
Sections 5.3 and 5.4. 
 
The struggle is not just about information but also over symbols, images and discourses: who 
gets to define security and how they represent themselves in the mass media; how violence 
is portrayed in popular culture78 and the social media; who uses the dramaturgy of lethal 
force, be it to legitimise international interventions (‘shock and awe’), or to recruit fighters and 
intimidate opponents during an armed insurgency (exemplary executions, ISIS style). It is 
also about the ability to construct and popularise counter-narratives of the kind discussed 
below.  
4.4 New forms of subaltern and unruly politics79  
Disenchantment with politics is widespread and is loosening public authority in many different 
political systems, both authoritarian and democratic. This loosening of public authority is 
most evident in so-called ‘fragile states’ – although the nature and extent of their fragility is 
                                               
77 As documented by for instance Greenwald (2014). 
78 On the interpenetration between military/strategic culture and popular culture see Luckham (1984). 
79 See Khanna (2012), Tadros (2013), Hossain (2011), Khanna et al. (2013). 
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much debated (see DFID 2010; OECD 2008; Brock et al. 2012; Boege et al. 2009; Call 2008; 
Hagmann and Pécklard 2010) – but is certainly not confined to them.  
 
New forms of subaltern politics have been sweeping in and shaking the foundations of 
regimes and entire systems of governance – including national security states previously 
thought to be impregnable like Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Syria. They have been accelerated 
by novel forms of citizen action and of political mobilisation, facilitated by new information 
technologies and social media (SMS, Facebook, Twitter and so on). In recent years these 
popular protests have mostly failed to bring about democratic changes comparable, say, to 
those achieved previously in Southern Europe, Latin America, the communist systems of 
Eastern Europe and South Africa. Yet this does not mean they could not do so.  
 
The opening of previously closed political arenas has failed to realise its emancipatory 
potential in part because it has simultaneously unleashed new and often vicious struggles to 
occupy these arenas by groups with little serious interest in democratic participation, except 
on their own terms. Civil society is not always a safe space and has sometimes been fought 
over violently, for instance by religious or ethnic militants, criminal interests or grasping 
political entrepreneurs. Lethal force has been deployed by militants and by despotic states 
alike in order to demobilise dissent. Populist appeals and religious ideologies have been 
invoked to drown out more democratic voices, most obviously but by no means only in the 
Arab world.  
 
Challenges from below have also set off counter-revolutions by national security elites to 
suborn democracy as in Russia and Thailand or indeed to re-occupy the state with 
apparently widespread popular support as in Egypt in 2013.80 Even genuinely democratic 
systems like Brazil, India, South Africa and more arguably Nigeria, face a different kind of 
struggle – to democratise democracy or at the very least to keep it half alive in the face of 
political recession, the inroads of the market, the decline of the public sphere and shrinking 
spaces for democratic politics.81  
 
In all of these contexts it is important to keep open channels of information and debate and to 
understand how best to tap into the energies of the new forms of politics. How this is done 
will vary: be it by expanding spaces for information-sharing and debate in existing liberal (and 
indeed illiberal) democracies; or by strategising participation and the use of information when 
the ground begins to shift under the feet of authoritarian regimes but there are risks of 
reversal; or by bringing hidden transcripts and excluded voices to the light of day when 
despots or armed militants trample on the rights of minorities, women, dissidents and 
ordinary citizens.  
                                               
80 This is to inadequately summarise highly complex and contradictory historical processes. The underlying point is that even 
the most widely supported popular uprisings like Egypt’s (Tadros 2013, 2014) create political junctures that are open to 
manipulation or capture.  
81 On the relationship between democratic institutions and democratic politics and how both relate to conflict see Luckham et al. 
(2003); Luckham (2011). 
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5 Towards more inclusive, democratic and 
secure societies 
5.1 Building cases for collective action 
This paper has tried to untangle the complex and fast changing dimensions of security and 
what they imply for ordinary people, especially those made insecure or left behind by global 
shifts and national traumas. What then can be concluded for the creation of more 
democratic, inclusive and secure societies, able to face up to the challenges of security and 
development in the twenty-first century? The argument developed above is that the gathering 
winds of change both open spaces for change and at the same time close them, posing fresh 
challenges to be overcome. The emergence of new poles of power and prosperity in the 
developing world have been reducing poverty and opening spaces in which to challenge 
Northern predominance; but have also tended to throw up new geographies of inequality and 
insecurity. Privatisation, including that of security, has unlocked opportunities for some, but 
excluded many more others. Technological innovation has created new possibilities for 
communication and information-sharing but also new forms of appropriation and surveillance. 
New forms of subaltern politics have sometimes reinvigorated ailing democratic institutions; 
but have also been diverted into new forms of exclusion and populist violence. 
 
Collective action to minimise the insecurities facing all humankind is essential in a world of 
rapid and complexly interdependent changes. But it remains a huge conundrum. Market 
forces and national interest have been eating away at existing structures of international 
collaboration, state regulation and democratic accountability. Existing international and 
regional institutions and their peacebuilding functions are scandalously under-resourced. It is 
not difficult to identify priorities such as the Sustainable Development Goals, human security 
benchmarks, slowing climate change, stemming the flood of refugees, or ending 
humanitarian crises, like those in Syria and Yemen. But it has proved far more difficult to 
agree on realistic strategies to deal with any of these challenges. The basic issue is how to 
transmute the vested interests, which block their resolution, into cooperation around shared 
objectives – and so convert zero sum into positive sum games from which all could benefit.  
 
Behind this are still deeper questions about the place in all this of global, national and local 
publics, of democratic politics and of exclusion and inclusion. Who determines that some 
issues not others are global and national priorities? How can a balance be achieved between 
the interests and priorities of developed and developing countries, as well as those more and 
less at risk? What say do global publics and national electorates have in shaping change 
agendas? Where is the voice of those most at risk – for instance, the citizens of small island 
states and tropical regions threatened by climate change, or minorities and refugees caught 
up in the maelstrom of violence in the Middle East? 
 
A central concern running through all these issues is how to create more democratic and 
inclusive societies in which people can claim greater control of their security – in a world in 
which the forces of power and profit continue to be stacked against them. The main 
challenges for research, analysis and policy are spelt out in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1  Making security more democratic and inclusive  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
One pressing challenge is to generate strategies for peace and democratic change, which 
can reshape the grain of history as well as respond to it – building on but moving beyond the 
short-term tactics of mitigation and of coping. These strategies would have to be forward-
looking enough to anticipate the winds of change as they gust forward. At the same time, 
they would have to be robust enough to confront the established hierarchies of power and 
wealth, which spread insecurity and poverty, globally, nationally and locally.   
 
Another challenge is how to develop democratic strategies for security so as to transcend the 
deep tensions between democracy and security, including but not confined to state-delivered 
security. This is the central issue, which tends to face efforts to build peace and to transform 
ailing or repressive security structures in so-called ‘fragile’ and conflict-affected states. Yet it 
is also a more general issue, which affects all states and political communities, in a world in 
which security remains both essential and deeply problematic.  
 
A further challenge is to transform security from below by directly addressing the deep 
inequalities and exclusions inherent both in security and in development. These inequalities 
need to be openly acknowledged and tackled head on in both analysis and policy. It is hard 
to see how this can be done without seeking credible democratic mandates from the people 
and groups who are ‘secured’ and ‘developed’. The journey from the streets and villages in 
which most people live to the pinnacles of the UN, Davos, the EU, DFID and (dare one say it) 
IDS and back again is bound to be vertiginous. But it is essential that it should be undertaken 
in order to negotiate priorities and policies, which they can understand, benefit from and 
influence in their own right.  
5.2 Working with and reshaping the grain of history 
Development policies and programmes tend to work according to short time frames, and 
security interventions to even shorter ones. In crisis situations immediate priority tends to be 
given to quick impact projects and to rapid stabilisation of insecure situations. Even longer-
term policy interventions like state-building, the demobilisation of ex-combatants or security 
sector and justice reforms, tend to march along constrained schedules determined by 
funding and accountability requirements. Not much attention is given to what historians term 
the longue durée – how patterns of capital accumulation, resource extraction and inequality 
41 
 
generate insecurities over long periods of time,82 how political change and social ordering 
takes place, how social identities crystallise and disintegrate, how bargains are made and 
unmade between citizens and those responsible for their security.  
 
A longer-run view would necessarily reposition both analysis and policy. It would entail 
historical analysis of how cycles of conflict play out over the long term and tie in with national 
and local pathways of accumulation and development. It would have to face up to the 
possibility that violence and insecurity are not simply externalities, but are inherent in 
development, state-making and state-breaking. It would require attentiveness to the ways 
peacebuilding blueprints, human rights frameworks, security reforms and development 
programmes, etc. might build upon as well as transform national and local histories. It would 
also counsel caution about their potentially unexpected or perverse consequences: for 
instance, their failure to help those who were supposed to be assisted; or their reinforcement 
of long-established inequalities and patterns of violence.  
 
History is what differentiates state-building (a managed, temporally bounded activity) from 
state-formation (the historically evolving negotiation and renegotiation of political authority). 
Democracy emerges both from the slow accretion of democratic institutions and from 
democratic politics and popular struggles.83 Recent analyses of political settlements and of 
negotiated states (see Schultze-Kraft and Hinkle 2014; Tadros 2014; Di John and Putzel 
2009; Scott-Villiers et al. 2014) emphasise the historically constructed and contingent nature 
of political authority and, likewise, democracy.84 Political settlements – particularly 
democratic settlements – emerge from struggles, sometimes violent, not just to control the 
state, but also to shape the rules of the political game (i.e. the rules of rule).  
 
These struggles tend to revolve around the ongoing tensions between stability, security and 
change. History is replete with Black Swan moments, or tail risks, when unlikely but 
catastrophic events occur and the unthinkable becomes the new normal.85 Seemingly ‘stable’ 
political settlements (like those in previous and some current regimes in the Arab world) may 
turn out to be surprisingly fragile. Peace agreements and democratic elections ‘ending’ 
violent conflicts may simply usher in new forms of insecurity.  
 
Rigorous historically informed analysis is needed of the ruptures which tip countries and 
localities into cycles of violence. It is even more essential to understand the critical 
conjunctures which can enable them to break free from these cycles. Too often historical 
opportunities opened at such critical junctures are missed. Or they are grasped by those, 
who happen to be in control of the means of force. Or they merely open the way to renewed 
cycles of violence and insecurity. Thus it is important to be attentive to varying historical 
pathways and to identify the spaces they open for democratic change – but also to anticipate 
how and by whom these spaces for change may be closed down. Five such critical junctures 
seem especially worthy of attention, although this is an incomplete list:  
 
 
 
 
                                               
82 See the case made for a historical perspective on agrarian change as a source of political violence by Cramer and Richards 
(2011).  
83 On the interplay between democratic institutions and democratic politics and the relationship both to development and to the 
management of conflict see Luckham et al. (2003). 
84 However, in partial contrast to these authors much of the literature on political settlements tends to prioritise the creation of 
political order over the establishment of democracy. This is understandable given the well-known shortcomings of democracy-
promotion. But it ignores the real potential of democratic legitimacy and accountability both in their own right and as sources of 
stable and legitimate political authority. 
85 See Taleb and Treverton (2015), who contrast the inability of highly centralised political systems like those of Syria, Libya and 
potentially Saudi Arabia to respond to political shocks with the greater resilience shown by more divided countries like Lebanon.  
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 Ruptures in ‘strong’ authoritarian regimes challenged by popular protests and/or 
armed rebellion. The key issue here tends to be who seizes the political moment and 
how. Outcomes have varied enormously even in the same region – like post-
communist Eastern Europe or in post-Arab Spring Middle East86 – ranging from civil 
war to varieties of authoritarian restoration to viable democratic transitions.  
 Political transitions forged after successful armed uprisings against repressive ancien 
régimes, including in some cases those previously propped up with external support 
(like Vietnam, Ethiopia, Eritrea and pre-genocide Rwanda). These uprisings open 
spaces for change, but also bring to power militarised groups, some in the Leninist 
mould, who tend to be resistant to democratic changes they are unable to stage-
manage. 
 Political settlements brokered through negotiated peace agreements, which end 
mutually hurting stalemates (as in El Salvador, South Africa, Sierra Leone, Nepal and 
potentially Colombia), and create spaces for democratic politics that are hard for any 
one party or group to monopolise. 
 The creation of pockets of peace within conditions of durable disorder (like in 
Somalia, DRC, Haiti and South Sudan) which can eventually become starting points 
for democratic alternatives to violence, as in the case of Somaliland.       
 Shifts in political balances within existing competitive or partially competitive 
democratic systems (like the recent opposition electoral victories in Sri Lanka and 
Nigeria), which could (but may not) reinvigorate ailing democratic institutions, and 
help contain violence.   
 
In none of these critical conjunctures are outcomes completely predetermined: each may just 
as easily lead to renewed violence as to peace. In none of them is democracy assured and 
even where it comes into being, can fall into disrepair unless invigorated through ongoing 
democratic politics. Political outcomes vary, sometimes radically. The divergences derive in 
part from different national histories; but they also flow from the strategic choices or non-
choices made by the key protagonists in each national situation. What seems often to make 
a difference is the capacity of major change coalitions both to mobilise popular support at key 
moments of change, and to construct durable local as well as national power bases and 
social alliances. In this respect, countries with long histories of violent conflict like post-
apartheid South Africa, Colombia or Nepal may even paradoxically enjoy a measure of 
comparative advantage, in that there are longer-established forms of non-violent as well as 
violent political action, upon which they can draw.  
5.3 Democratic strategies towards security  
There are deep tensions between democracy and security provision in all states, not just 
those affected by despotic rule and violent conflict.87 The tensions tend to revolve around the 
use of the mantle of security to justify state coercion, to protect vested interests rather than 
citizens, and to impose secrecy, restrict information and stifle debate. Hence democratic 
strategies towards military and security establishments are vital;88 to ease democratic and 
war-to-peace transitions; to protect against regression to military or authoritarian governance; 
and to ensure democratic accountability, even in functioning democracies. These strategies 
require good empirical understanding of how and for whom security institutions function, as 
well as the political contexts in which they operate. Democratic strategies are if anything 
even more essential in conditions of acute ongoing political violence, where they tend to face 
                                               
86 As analysed in the Egyptian case by Tadros (2012a, 2012b and 2014). 
87 Discussed in Luckham (2011) and Pearce, McGee and Wheeler (2011). 
88 Stepan (1988: Preface and chapter 1) made a convincing case for democratic strategies towards military and security 
establishments during Latin America’s democratic transitions. Recent events in Burma, Egypt, Thailand and elsewhere suggest 
that the need for democratic strategies is just as relevant now as it was then. See also Cawthra and Luckham (2003). 
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the additional and even more formidable task of taming non-state as well as state armed 
formations. 
 
Much international effort has gone into rebuilding and reforming the security and justice 
institutions of fragile and conflict-affected states: including peacebuilding and stabilisation 
initiatives; disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR); and security sector reform 
(SSR).89 Yet these initiatives have seldom added up to credible democratic strategies with 
solid roots in locally driven democratisation. Only in a few cases have they tangibly increased 
the accountability of security institutions. All too infrequently have they made these 
institutions more responsive to the rights and day-to-day needs of those they are supposed 
to protect.  
 
This must raise serious doubts about the engagement of development agencies and NGOs 
in security policies and programmes. Do they in reality contribute towards durable 
peacebuilding and citizen security? Or is the sum total of their efforts a collective failure to 
address underlying insecurities, failed statebuilding and indeed a further securitisation of 
development?90 
 
To answer these questions, development analysts and practitioners call for evidence-based 
policymaking. They can draw upon a substantial pool of empirical analysis on peacebuilding 
successes and failures, much larger than what was available at the end of the Cold War. Yet 
in practice they continue to ignore historical lessons, to generate large quantities of what 
Cramer and Goodhand (2011) call policy-based evidence, and thus to repeat many of the 
same mistakes.  
 
Much of the problem is political in that those with whom development practitioners engage 
usually have their own political interests and bureaucratic agendas at stake. It is one thing to 
accept in principle the need to work with the grain of imperfect political settlements; to 
operate in political marketplaces in which aid itself becomes a commodity and source of 
patronage; and to engage with the traditional and non-state bodies, which deliver security 
and justice in hybrid political orders (Bagayoko and Luckham forthcoming). It is quite another 
to be sucked into Faustian bargains with extractive political elites, warlords, ethnic or 
religious militias in politically charged and violent policy environments. All too often, 
stabilisation efforts and security reform programmes end up politically compromised, in effect 
reaffirming the national and local power relations at the root of insecurity and violence. And 
all too often the costs of this compromised and unequal security are imposed on poor and 
vulnerable people. 
 
Moreover, the lack of accountability and transparency extends to the policy interventions of 
the international community itself. Even where there are shared goals, there may be little 
agreement on how to get there, including clashing political and economic interests; complex 
problems of coordinating bureaucracies with divergent priorities and ways of doing things; as 
well as issues over both how and to whom they are accountable. The difficulties tend to be 
even more intractable when not even goals are shared: as with the current international 
policy disarray over Palestine and over the conflicts in Ukraine, Syria and Yemen, which 
have inextricably become entangled with the divergent security concerns of the major 
international players.  
 
                                               
89 There is now a large policy literature on security policies and programmes in fragile and post-conflict countries. Nevertheless, 
there is still too little empirical analysis of how these programmes play out in practice. On the ways SSR programmes do and do 
not get ‘lost in translation’ see Hills (2010, 2011), Bryden and Olonisakin (2010) and Sedra (2010). On the contested politics and 
practice of stabilisation and its links to counterinsurgency see Collinson, Elhawary and Muggah (2010), which introduces 
penetrating case studies of stabilisation in a special issue of Disasters.  
90 For good critiques see Selby (2013) and Richmond (2014). There are, however many more such critiques than analyses of 
when and how peacebuilding has succeeded. 
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It may be possible to guard against these dilemmas by being more reflexive and self-critical, 
so as to avoid the more obvious dangers of donor hubris, mission creep and perverse 
outcomes. A good starting point could be the simple recognition that peaceful transitions 
from violence and despotic rule should not be and indeed cannot be stage-managed by 
outsiders.  
 
Yet all this still begs the question of how best to assist those who have serious commitment 
to creating a viable peace and to building inclusive, responsive and accountable security 
institutions. Development agencies and international NGOs, which fund or engage with 
critical voices and counter-elites, as well as with government insiders, risk satisfying neither. 
They often also face accusations of political interference. More serious is the possible danger 
to the welfare and safety of those with whom they cooperate (for instance, women’s groups 
in countries like Afghanistan or Pakistan or externally funded civil society organisations in 
countries like Egypt, Ethiopia or Rwanda). That does not of course mean they should shirk 
their responsibilities towards those who are critical of or targeted by violent elites and 
dysfunctional political authorities. It does, however, require more alertness to the possibility 
that their interventions may do more harm than good to those they are supposed to assist.91   
5.4 Transforming security from below92 
A thread which runs through the analysis in this paper is that although security is a public 
good globally, nationally and locally, it also tends to protect dominant state interests and 
established property relations. In consequence, its costs and its benefits are unequally 
distributed. There is an inherent tendency (shared in common with economic development) 
to discount the welfare and safety of those who are impoverished, marginalised and insecure 
and therefore least able to stand up for their rights as citizens and as human beings.  
 
The fundamental challenge is how to democratise the dominant discourse and practice of 
security according to which states and the international community protect and citizens are 
protected – and to do so without at the same time leaving large numbers of people 
unprotected, excluded and insecure. It has much in common with the challenge of 
transforming development from a discipline and policy practice, which treats poor people as 
the beneficiaries of development, to one which regards them as agents of change – with the 
crucial addition that power relations are even more central in the determination of security 
than they are in the practice of development. 
 
A vernacular or citizen perspective ought to be the departure point for security analysis and 
policy, rather than treating security as simply the end-product of a well-protected and well-
policed state. Due regard should be paid to the vernacular understandings of all those who 
are ‘secured’, especially those who are marginalised and vulnerable, to ensure that security 
and justice institutions be legitimate in their eyes and responsive to their needs. A citizen-
centred approach would both empower local-level policing and justice institutions and ensure 
they are accountable to those they serve. It would also recognise the role of informal or 
hybrid forms of security provision – whilst recognising and seeking to control the ways they 
tend to entrench social inequalities and gender biases.93 All this would fit into broader 
strategies to decentralise the day-to-day business of governance and to strengthen local 
institutions – though once again recognising the limits of decentralisation and its tendency 
sometimes to create new, decentralised and sometimes violent struggles over power and 
resources.94 
                                               
91 ‘Do No Harm’ (Anderson 1999) is a well-recognised principle of humanitarian aid, and is if anything even more relevant to 
security assistance. Yet it is difficult to apply consistently and tends to be more honoured in its breach than in its observance.  
92 See Colak and Pearce (2009). 
93 See the discussion of security in the vernacular in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 and also Bagayoko and Luckham (forthcoming). 
94 See Scott-Villiers et al. (2014) for an analysis of how decentralisation shifted the locus of political patronage and violence from 
the national to the local level in Marsabit County, Kenya. 
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But this would all be window-dressing unless it could be combined with serious efforts to 
address persistent inequalities in access to security provision and other public goods. In turn 
this would necessitate tackling the agrarian exploitation, urban neglect and hierarchies of 
identity deepening these inequalities and generating endemic insecurity and violence. To be 
sure, it is important to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate ex-combatants, to make security 
institutions more accountable and to explore the potential of non-state security and justice 
institutions, etc. But none of these measures are likely to succeed without at the same time 
tackling youth marginalisation and unemployment, inequities in the distribution of land and 
other resources, entrenched gender discriminations and violence, the mal-distribution of 
resource revenues and the corrosive impacts of political patronage, corruption and violence. 
 
None of this is likely to occur unless citizens themselves can mobilise for change and can 
influence or indeed supersede the bargains among elites, which in large measure determine 
the allocation of power, resources and security. We know from research as well as 
development practice that citizens have more agency than they are often given credit for (for 
examples see McGee 2014; McGee and Flórez López 2015 forthcoming; Oosterom 2014; 
Scott-Villiers et al. 2014). A good deal of this is what Moser and Horn (2011) call coping 
agency:95 including the extraordinary capacity of ordinary people to adjust their lives to the 
direst circumstances and to navigate the chaos and violence around them. But too sharp a 
distinction should not be drawn between coping and transformative agency. Safe spaces 
created to protect young people from intimidation can also be used to educate them as 
citizens and prevent them from being recruited into violence.96 Small gestures of defiance, 
such as the refusal of women from clashing ethnic groups to cut off contact with each other, 
can help to build confidence and begin to reverse cycles of fear and mistrust.97 Citizen-led 
development initiatives, for instance to ensure clean water supplies in marginalised urban 
areas, can also bring attention to the political violence, corruption and corporate relationships 
which create barriers to the provision of these and other public goods.98  
 
The fundamental challenge, however, is how to consolidate and expand such weapons of the 
weak so that they can compel the attention of the strong and pose credible alternatives to 
violence. A handful of studies illustrate the wider transformative potential of citizen action, for 
instance Somaliland’s decentralised peace process; and the forms of citizen cooperation 
kept alive during the civil war in Mozambique, which preserved local services in desperate 
conditions, maintained networks of cooperation, consolidated resistance to violence and 
contributed to the ultimate success of peace negotiations.99 The main achievement in each 
case was a negotiated and popularly endorsed end to war; although in both countries doubts 
have surfaced over the sustainability, equity and development gains of the subsequent 
peace. 
 
Like sustainable peace, inclusive and democratically accountable security is an ongoing 
struggle not an end-state. It is in part a struggle over information and analysis, so as to 
render more visible the invisible relationships which glue together systems of exploitation, 
power and violence, locally, nationally and globally. In a globalising world this also means 
exploiting the full potential of social media and mass communication, whilst remaining wary 
of their pitfalls and limitations. It requires recognition of the possibilities opened up by the 
diverse forms of subaltern politics, some of them potentially violent: crowd sourcing, mass 
protests, popular movements, citizen uprisings, etc.  
                                               
95 See also Vigh (2006) on social navigation. 
96 As with youth groups studied by Oosterom and Lloyd (2014) in Zimbabwe. 
97 As in Marsabit County, Kenya: Scott-Villiers et al. (2014: 18–20). 
98 As in Bueneventura, Colombia: McGee and Flórez López (2015 forthcoming). 
99 Nordstrom (1997) provides an especially compelling account of the civic action and the resistance of ordinary citizens to 
armed violence during the civil war and peace process in Mozambique. On the Somaliland peace process see Bradbury (2008). 
A recent and more critical assessment is Hohne (2013).   
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At the same time, the potential of more routine, everyday forms of democratic politics cannot 
be neglected. Citizens should not have to wait for great transformative events to sweep them 
along; not least because such events are themselves the products of history and of human 
agency. However, they should be prepared to make good use of historical opportunities 
when they arise – and struggle as best they can to ensure the spaces that are opened for 
change are not meanwhile occupied by the greedy, the strong, the fanatical and the violent.  
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